

Feedback Form

Long-Term 2 RFP – August 20, 2026

Feedback Provided by:

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To promote transparency, feedback submitted will be posted on the Long-Term 2 RFP engagement page unless otherwise requested by the sender.

- ☐ **NO - There is confidential information, do not post**
☒ **YES - Comfortable to publish to the IESO web page**

Following the August 20th, Long-Term 2 RFP engagement webinar, the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) is seeking feedback from stakeholders on the items discussed. The presentation and recording can be accessed from the [Long-Term Procurement engagement webpage](#).

Note: The IESO will accept additional materials where it may be required to support your rationale provided below. When sending additional materials, please indicate if they are confidential.

Please submit feedback to engagement@ieso.ca by September 4, 2026.

Repowering

Do you have feedback on the proposed requirements?

- Repowering: Requirement for Commercial Operation:

No comments at this time.

- Repowering: Competition Mechanics:

No comments at this time.

Federal Crown Land

Please inform the IESO if you intend to site your project on federal Crown land.

TransAlta has not made any decisions at this time on whether to pursue a project on federal Crown land.

Disclosure of Additional Pricing Information for Window 1

Do you have feedback the IESO should consider when determining whether to release price curves for LT2 Window 1?

TransAlta supports the IESO releasing price curves for LT2 Window 1. More generally, greater transparency regarding competitive offers can enhance market efficiency by improving participants' ability to understand the relationship between project attributes, procurement objectives and clearing outcomes. The release of price curves would help proponents better assess the cost and value drivers that influenced successful offers, support more informed bid formation in future procurement windows and reduces reliance on speculation regarding the level of competition required to clear.

Access to this information can also improve allocative efficiency by enabling developers to identify where cost reductions, siting decisions, technology choices or contract structuring improvements are most likely to produce competitive outcomes. Over time, this should support stronger participation, better calibrated offers and more efficient procurement results for ratepayers. Providing price curve information after the procurement has concluded preserves the confidentiality of individual bids while still giving the market useful information to support future competition, investment discipline and price discovery.

General Comments/Feedback

Do you have additional feedback to share with the IESO?

TransAlta supports the development of a separate capacity stream procurement for gas-fired generation. A targeted procurement would more appropriately align resource selection with the specific reliability attributes required by the system, including dependable capacity, operational flexibility, fuel-backed energy availability and the ability to sustain output during extended periods of system stress.

Direct competition between gas-fired generation and resources with different reliability characteristics may result in inefficient procurement outcomes if the evaluation framework does not fully account for differences in capacity value, duration, dispatchability and performance during scarcity conditions. While a technology-neutral process may appear efficient when assessed only on price, it can undervalue resources that provide sustained, dispatchable capacity and overvalue resources that are less able to support resource adequacy during prolonged reliability events.

This issue is reinforced by the IESO's recent technical work on the effective load carrying capability of energy storage, which indicates that the capacity value of storage declines as penetration increases and that longer-duration storage is required at higher penetration levels to sustain its reliability contribution. These findings highlight that nameplate capacity and offer price are not, on their own, sufficient measures of reliability value. Even longer-duration battery storage resources can experience diminishing effective load carrying capability as penetration increases, underscoring the importance of separately valuing resources that provide sustained, dispatchable and fuel-secure capacity.

A separate gas-fired generation procurement enhances transparency and efficiency by defining the reliability need being procured, establishing evaluation criteria that reflect those reliability attributes and avoiding direct competition between resources that are not providing equivalent system services. This approach would also provide clearer investment signals for resources capable of supporting Ontario's reliability needs through periods of high demand, low renewable output or extended system stress.