

# Market Rule Amendment Proposal

# PART 1 – MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identification No.: MR-00349-R		MR-00349-R00				
Subject:	Enhance	Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): Settlement Guarantees				
Title:	Day-Ahead Commitment Process Variables, Data, and Information					
Nature of Proposal: Alteration		Alteration		Deletion		Addition
Chapter:	9			Appendix:		
Sections:	15:					
Sub-sections proposed for amending: 3			3.1.2A, 3	.1.2B, 3.1.2C, 3	3.1.2D (new	v)

# PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY

Version	Reason for Issuing	Version Date			
1.0	Working Draft for Discussion Purposes	September 11, 2009			
2.0	Working Draft for Discussion Purposes	November 17, 2009			
3.0	Draft for Technical Panel Review	December 9, 2009			
4.0	Publish for Stakeholder Review and Comment	December 17, 2009			
Approved Ame	Approved Amendment Publication Date:				
Approved Amendment Effective Date:					

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### Summary

The MR-00349 market rule amendments specify the settlement activities for the determination of reliability guarantee payments and related settlement amounts for the enhanced day-ahead commitment process (EDAC).

This amendment, MR-00349-R00, specifies the IESO obligations to determine and carry forward to the settlement process the information and data necessary to determine EDAC reliability guarantees and other related settlement amounts.

These IESO obligations are necessary to ensure transparent, accurate and timely determination of the relevant settlement amounts.

#### Background

In 2007, the IESO initiated a study to assess how IESO day-ahead mechanisms might be amended to support anticipated changes in Ontario's electricity sector. The study addressed both current and future challenges including how to most efficiently integrate and optimize Ontario's changing infrastructure. The merits of various possible day-ahead mechanisms were studied and assessed under <u>Stakeholder Engagement Plan 21 (SE-21)</u>.

Cost benefit analysis (CBA) techniques were used to help identify improvements to day-ahead mechanisms that would result in net benefits to the Province as a whole relative to the current day-ahead commitment process (DACP). The cost-benefit analysis included both IESO and stakeholder costs and compared them to benefits measured through overall market efficiency impacts.

Following a review of the Assessment with stakeholders, the IESO day-ahead team recommended, and the IESO Board of Directors agreed at its June 19, 2008 meeting, to proceed with a stepped approach for moving forward, starting with the design of the common elements of the differing options.

These common elements are:

- Optimization of commitment over the entire 24 hours of the next day;
- Use of multiple passes of the constrained algorithm to determine commitment and

#### resource scheduling; and

• Three-part offers, i.e. the use of offers for energy supported by submitted 'fixed'<sup>1</sup> costs and technical data.

From the results of the preliminary work, the large majority of stakeholders and Stakeholder Advisory Committee (SAC) members concluded that the proposed design of the common elements, the principles behind the cost guarantees, and the inclusion of exports were acceptable because they would benefit the province.

At its meeting on September 5, 2008 the IESO Board granted approval for the development of the common elements (described above) and delegated to the Audit Committee of the IESO Board the responsibility for oversight of the EDAC project.

On February 11, 2009 the IESO's Audit Committee approved version 1.0 of the EDAC Market Design and directed IESO staff and the Technical Panel to develop the market rule amendments necessary to implement the design.

For further information on the EDAC Settlement Guarantees please refer to:

http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/mr2009/MR-00349-Q00.pdf

The following design document outlines the design details for the common elements, export inclusion and day-ahead guarantees for both generators and importers: <a href="http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/se21-edac/se21-20090206-EDAC\_Market\_Design\_v1.pdf">http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/consult/se21-edac/se21-20090206-EDAC\_Market\_Design\_v1.pdf</a>

For further information on the EDAC calculation engine market rules please refer to:

MR-00348: Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): 24 Hour Optimization and 3-part Offers at the following links: <u>http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/mr2009/MR-00348-R00-R05.pdf</u> and <u>http://www.ieso.ca/imoweb/pubs/mr2009/MR-00348-R06.pdf</u>.

#### Discussion

One of the key elements of the EDAC Settlement Guarantees is the introduction of a new Day-Ahead Production Cost Guarantee (DA-PCG) which will replace the Day-Ahead Generation Cost Guarantee.

The design of the Day-Ahead Production Cost Guarantee (DA-PCG) allows eligible dispatchable generation facilities guaranteed cost recovery if dispatched to produce in the real-time market when real-time revenue is insufficient to cover as-offered costs incorporated in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Typically includes unit start-up and minimum generation costs (commonly referred to as 'fixed costs' although this may not meet the formal accounting definition of a fixed production cost).

schedules committed to day-ahead.

Commitments, schedules and DA–PCG will be based upon cost and technical information made available in advance of the day-ahead scheduling process.

In contrast to the existing DACP day-ahead generation cost guarantee (DA-GCG) program, with the implementation of EDAC, those eligible resources receiving day-ahead commitments and schedules cannot reject their commitment and can only remove themselves from day-ahead commitments through a withdrawal process.

The DA-PCG calculations:

- will consider the schedule of record quantity for each start over the entire 24-hour dispatch day;
- will consider real-time energy-only schedules on a 5-minute interval basis for the lower of allocated quantity of energy injected (AQEI) and real-time constrained schedule; and
- will be based on the total day-ahead schedules versus today's minimum loading point for minimum generation block run time (MGBRT).

The Derivation of Day-Ahead Production Cost Guarantees

The proposed method for calculating the DA-PCG payments made to eligible dispatchable generators consists of five components:

- 1. Component 1: Any shortfall in payment on the delivered real-time dispatch of the schedule of record quantity will be based upon the real-time revenue received for that amount of energy in comparison with the offered costs as represented in the generator's day-ahead offer;
- 2. Component 2: For the portion of the schedule of record quantity that is not implemented in the real-time dispatch schedule, the DA-PCG will guarantee the cost of arranging the delivery (where the real-time offer price is less than the day-ahead offer price), or subtract any gain (where the real-time offer price is greater than the day-ahead offer price);
- 3. Component 3: Any income from real-time CMSC included in a generator's schedule of record quantity delivered in real-time will be used to reduce the DA-PCG payment; and
- 4. Component 4: The net operating reserve (OR) income realized by generators whose real-time dispatch for energy is less than their day-ahead constrained schedule for energy. Any net income from real-time operating reserve in a generator's schedule of record quantity will be used to reduce the DA-PCG payment.
- 5. Component 5: As offered value of bringing an off-line generator on-line to minimum loading point.

The DA-PCG payment is calculated as follows:

• DA-PCG payment = Component 1 + Component 2 - Component 3 - Component 4 + Component 5

If the DA-PCG payment result from this calculation is negative, the DA-PCG payment is equal to zero.

The DA-PCG payment is calculated for each EDAC start event. An EDAC start event is defined as the period from the first hour with a day-ahead constrained schedule to the last consecutive hour with a day-ahead constrained schedule. A dispatch day may have multiple EDAC start events.

- In the example below (Figure 1), there are 2 EDAC start events within the dispatch day:
  - EDAC start event A is from HE 4 to HE 13; and
  - EDAC start event B is from HE17 to HE 23.

The DA-PCG payment is assessed separately for each EDAC start event (i.e. a DA-PCG payment is assessed for EDAC start event A and a DA-PCG payment is assessed for EDAC start event B).




Figure 1: Example of Multiple EDAC Start Events

A market participant may withdraw their offers for the day-ahead schedule associated with each start or may withdraw after starting but before completing each day-ahead schedule. In both cases, the market participant may or may not be eligible for the DA-PCG as follows:

- If the withdrawal was not within the market participant's control, the market participant is eligible for the DA-PCG for the hours not withdrawn. The market participant will not be assessed the Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge.
- If the withdrawal was within the market participant's control, the market participant is not eligible for the DA-PCG for that start. The market participant will be assessed the Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge.

The Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge is assessed independently for each scheduled EDAC start event. In the example above (Figure 1), if the market participant withdraws in HE10 and the withdrawal was within the market participant's control, the market participant is assessed the Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge for EDAC start event A, from HE10 through HE13, and is assessed a separate Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge for EDAC

start event B from HE17 through HE23.

De-commitment refers to the IESO removing the Minimum Loading Point constraint of a nonquick start generator from the system. It is neither a de-rate nor forced outage but a complete removal of the unit initiated by the IESO.

If the generation unit is de-committed, the market participant may or may not be eligible for the DA-PCG, for each start event, as follows:

- For de-commitment before the start of the day-ahead schedule, the IESO will not calculate the DA-PCG for the market participant. The market participant will not be assessed the Generator Withdrawal Charge.
- For de-commitment after the start of the day-ahead schedule, the IESO will calculate the DA-PCG incurred by the market participant prior to de-commitment. The market participant will not be assessed the Generator Withdrawal Charge.

The specific market rule amendments associated with the Generator Withdrawal Charge can be found in MR-00349-R02.

With respect to the day-ahead commitment process variables, data, and information it is proposed to modify Chapter 9 of the market rules in the following fashion:

- Delete section 3.1.2A and replace it with a new section 3.1.2A to specify the day-ahead commitment process variables, data and information;
- Modify section 3.1.2B to specify the IESO's obligations in regards to the provision of information to the settlement process;
- Modify section 3.1.2C to specify, in accordance with the EDAC design, the provision to the settlement process of pre-dispatch quantities and prices; and
- Added section 3.1.2D to specify the pre-dispatch process variables, data and information.

All of this information is necessary to determine the applicable settlement amounts associated with the EDAC design.

Please note that aside from MR-00349-R00 there will also be consequential amendments also required in section 4.7D of Chapter 9 of the market rules in relation to the DA-PCG and these are located within MR-00349-R04.

#### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

#### Day-Ahead Commitment Process Variables, Data and Information

3.1.2A The *IESO* shall determine the following day-ahead pre-dispatch-quantities from the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record, and provide them directly to the *settlement process*:

PDRDA_DQSIk	=	<u>schedule of record quantity scheduled for injection by market</u> <u>participant</u> 'k' for an import transaction at <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' <u>during metering interval</u> 't' of <u>settlement hour</u> 'h' <u>pre-dispatch of</u> <u>record</u> constrained quantity scheduled for injection by market <u>participant</u> 'k' for an import transaction at <i>intertie metering</i> <u>point</u> 'i' during metering interval 't' of <u>settlement hour</u> 'h'
PDRDA_DQSIk ,h	=	<u>schedule of record quantity scheduled for injection by market</u> <u>participant 'k' at delivery point 'm' during metering interval 't' of</u> <u>settlement hour 'h'pre-dispatch of record constrained quantity</u> <u>scheduled for injection by market participant 'k' at delivery</u> <u>point 'm' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h'</u>
DA_DQSW <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>	Ξ	<u>schedule of record quantity scheduled for withdrawal by</u> <u>market participant 'k' for an export transaction at intertie</u> <u>metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement</u> <u>hour 'h'</u>

DA_ELMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>m.t</sup>	Ξ	day-ahead constrained schedule intertie price at the <i>delivery</i> <i>point</i> 'm' of the sink for the export transaction during <i>metering</i> <i>interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'
<u>DA_ILMP<sub>h</sub><sup>m,t</sup></u>	Ξ	day-ahead constrained schedule intertie price at the <i>delivery</i> point 'm' of the source for the import transaction during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h'

#### 3.1.2B The *IESO* shall provide directly to the *settlement process*:

- 3.1.2B.1 information to identify *market participants* which <u>elected to are</u> receivedeemed to have accepted in accordance with section 5.8.4 of <u>Chapter 7</u> a day-ahead <u>generation production</u> cost guarantee for their *generation facility*;
- 3.1.2B.2 information to identify any event in which the *IESO* de-commits a *generation facility* between the release and publication of the *pre*-

*dispatch schedules* from the *pre-dispatch schedule* of record and the end of its <u>committed</u> schedule<u>d *minimum* in the *schedule* of record</u> *run time* where the *market participant* has <u>elected been deemed</u> to receive to have accepted in accordance with section 5.8.4 of Chapter 7 a day-ahead <u>generation production</u> cost guarantee for that *facility*;

- 3.1.2B.3 exemptions from the day-ahead import failure charge described in section 3.8B, for any applicable import transactions scheduled in the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record where such exemptions have been determined in accordance with chapter 7, section 7.5.8B;
- 3.1.2B.4 any necessary information regarding import transactions in the constrained schedule from the *pre-dispatch of record* the financiallybinding status of which the *market participant* has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the *IESO* in accordance with the applicable *market manual*; and
- 3.1.2B.4 exemptions from the day-ahead export failure charge described in section 3.8D, for any applicable export transactions scheduled in the schedule of record where such exemptions have been determined in accordance with chapter 7, section 7.5.8B;
- 3.1.2B.5 the following information:

 represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during
 metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price-quantity pair, where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

energy offers submitted into the pre-dispatch of record,

- 3.1.2B.5 exemptions from the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge described in section 3.8E, for any applicable linked wheel transactions scheduled in the *schedule of record* where such exemptions have been determined in accordance with chapter 7, section 7.5.8B; and
- 3.1.2B.6 exemptions from the day-ahead generator withdrawal charge described in section 3.8F, for any applicable *registered facility* scheduled in the *schedule of record* where such exemptions have been determined in accordance with chapter 7, section 7.5.3.
- <u>3.1.2B.7</u> the following information:
- <u>DA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub> m.t</u> = <u>energy offers submitted in day-ahead, represented as an N by 2</u> matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k'

		at delivery point 'm' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2
DA_BE <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>	Ξ	<u>energy offers submitted in day-ahead, represented as an N by 2</u> <u>matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k'</u> <u>at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of</u> <u>settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered</u> price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2
<u>DA_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup></u>	Ξ	<u>energy bids</u> submitted in day-ahead, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2
DA_SNLC <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>m</sup>	≞	as-offered speed-no-load cost associated with three-part offers for a given settlement hour 'h' for market participant 'k' at delivery point 'm'
DA_SUC <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>m</sup>	Ξ	as-offered start-up cost associated with three-part offers for a given settlement hour 'h' for market participant 'k' at delivery point 'm'
$\underline{MLP_{k,h}}^{m,t}$	Ξ	minimum output of energy the market participant 'k' at delivery point 'm' can maintain without ignition support in metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h'

3.1.2C The *IESO* shall determine from the *pre-dispatch schedule* and the *pre-dispatch* projected *market schedule*, and provide directly to the *settlement process* the following *pre-dispatch prices* and quantities:

$\underline{PD}\underline{D}QSI_{k,h}{}^{i,t}$	=	<i>pre- dispatch</i> constrained quantity scheduled for injection by <i>market participant</i> 'k' at <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'-
$PD\_DQSW_{k,h}{}^{i,t}$	=	<i>pre- dispatch</i> constrained quantity scheduled for withdrawal by <i>market participant</i> 'k' at <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'-
PD_EMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>m,t</sup>	=	<i>pre-dispatch</i> projected <i>energy market price</i> applicable to all <i>delivery points</i> 'm' in the Ontario zone in <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'
		In instances where this variable is provided to the <i>settlement</i> process on an hourly basis as determined in section 3.9, it shall be deemed to apply uniformly to all metering intervals 't' in <i>settlement hour</i> 'h' <del>.</del>
PD_ELMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>m,t</sup>	Ξ	<i>pre-dispatch</i> constrained schedule <i>intertie</i> price at the <i>delivery point</i> 'm' of the sink for the export transaction during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'
PD_ILMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>m,t</sup>	Ξ	<i>pre-dispatch</i> constrained schedule <i>intertie</i> price at the <i>delivery</i> <i>point</i> 'm' of the source for the import transaction during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'

# 3.1.2D The *IESO* shall provide directly to the *settlement process*:

# <u>3.1.2D.1 the following information:</u>

<u>PD_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup></u>	energy offers submitted in pre-dispatch, in 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each at intertie metering point 'i' during meters settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending price in each price quantity pair where o column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in the settlement of the	<i>market participant</i> 'k' ring interval 't' of g order by the offered ffered prices 'P' are in
<u>PD_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup></u>	energy bids submitted in pre-dispatch, re 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each at intertie metering point 'i' during meter settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending price in each price quantity pair where o column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are i	<i>market participant</i> 'k' <u>ring interval</u> 't' of g order by the offered <u>ffered prices</u> 'P' are in

# PART 5 – IESO BOARD DECISION RATIONALE

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# **Market Rule Amendment Proposal**

#### PART 1 – MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identification No.: MR-00349-R0		MR-00349-R01			
Subject:	Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): Settlement Guarantees				
Title:	Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee				
Nature of Proposal: Alteration			Deletion	Addition	
Chapter:	9			Appendix:	
Sections:					
Sub-sections proposed for amending:		-	3.8A.2, 3.8A.2A 3.8A.7, 3.8A.8, 1	 , 3.8A.3, 3.8A.4, 3.8A.5,	

# PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY – PLEASE REFER TO MR-00349-R00

Version	Reason for Issuing	Version Date
Approved Amendment Publication Date:		
Approved Amendment Effective Date:		

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### **Summary**

MR-00349-R01 proposes to modify the market rules to specify the conditions and calculation of the following EDAC settlement amounts:

- The day-ahead intertie offer guarantee; and
- The real-time and day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credit offset.

#### **Background**

Please refer to MR-00349-R00.

#### **Discussion**

#### Intertie Offer Guarantee

The Intertie Offer Guarantee (IOG) payment process has been introduced to reflect the new EDAC design where a market participant will be paid a single IOG payment for an import transaction net of any offset.

Based on the existing *IESO market rules*, a market participant can be paid a Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee (DA-IOG) and a Real-Time Intertie Offer Guarantee (RT-IOG) for the same import transaction, with the lesser of the two payments being reversed to ensure that the market participant receives the higher of the two payments.

In addition, a separate process is then used to determine an offset (clawback) of the market participant's imports (MW) up to the market participant's level of real-time unconstrained export (MW) within the hour. The offset dollars (i.e. all or a portion of the RT-IOG payment or DA-IOG payment) associated with the import transaction's offset (clawback) MW is settled through a charge to the market participant.

With EDAC, DA-IOG and RT-IOG continue to exist however they are not settled separately. Instead the DA-IOG payment and the RT-IOG payment will feed into the EDAC IOG process where any IOG offsets will be determined and the net IOG payment will be determined.

# A Modified Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee (DA-IOG)

It is proposed to modify sections 3.8A.1, 3.8A.2A and 3.8A.2B of Chapter 9 to specify the following elements of the EDAC design.

Similar to the existing day-ahead processes, import offers will:

- remain voluntary and participating in the day-ahead process does not preclude real-time import offers which may be in addition to, or may replace day-ahead import transactions.
- be committed in the selection of resources to serve the market demand and in real-time, if the day-ahead forecast and resource dispatch is identical, that import should remain economic into real-time pre-dispatch and be appropriately selected to serve real-time market demand.

The Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee (DA-IOG) gives importers a guaranteed cost recovery when real-time revenue is insufficient to cover as-offered costs to provide energy that was committed the day-ahead and that actually flowed in the real-time market.

#### The Derivation of Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantees:

The design of DA-IOG is consistent with the principles of the DA-PCG and, for the most part, the existing design of the Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Settlement Credit of the DACP. The proposed method for calculating the DA-IOG payments made to eligible importers consists of three components:

- 1. Component 1: Any shortfall in payment on the real-time import flow of the schedule of record quantity will be based upon the real-time revenue received for that amount of energy in comparison with the offered costs submitted in the importer's day-ahead offer;
- 2. Component 2: For the portion of schedule of record quantity that is not implemented in the realtime dispatch schedule, the DA- IOG will guarantee the cost incurred of arranging the import (where the real-time offer price is less than the day-ahead offer price) or subtract any revenue gained (where the real-time offer price is greater than the day-ahead offer price); and
- 3. Component 3: Any income from real-time CMSC included in an importer's schedule of record quantity delivered in real-time will be used to reduce the DA-IOG payment.

#### Modifications to IOG Offset Mechanism

It is proposed to modify sections 3.8A.3 - 3.8A.6 to specify the following EDAC design elements.

The IOG Offset mechanism as described in the current IESO market rules for Real-time Intertie Offer Guarantee and Intertie Offer Guarantee Offset must be revised to recognize the addition of exports into the day-ahead scheduling process and to recognize the difference in payments made to importers under the different options.

#### **Financially Binding Status Eliminated**

An exception to the intertie offer guarantee (IOG) offset process allows traders with financially binding status (FBS) to retain IOGs paid in respect of day-ahead import transactions which received a schedule in a neighbouring day-ahead market even when there are scheduled real-time exports out of Ontario in the same hour (called an implied wheel-through). The inclusion of exports into day-ahead removes some of the drivers for FBS.

As well, a review of the current FBS revealed the following:

- FBS exemption has very little impact to the IOG Offset as determined through historical analysis;
- FBS exemption does not always provide a financial benefit to traders through reduced IOG

Offset as determined through analysis; and

• DA-IOG is subjected to IOG Offset calculations whether with FBS or not.

Including Day-Ahead exports in EDAC increases the complexity of an already complicated IOG Offset calculation in the event that FBS exemption was to continue.

There will be no exceptions to the IOG offset process in EDAC. That is the current FBS will cease with the implementation and the consideration of whether a transaction has FBS status will be removed from the IOG Offset settlement process.

#### **Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Adjustments**

It is proposed to delete sections 3.8A.7 - 3.8A.9 of Chapter 9 because the EDAC settlement guarantees design does not require these adjustments.

#### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

#### **3.8A** Hourly Settlement Amounts for Intertie Offer Guarantees

- 3.8A.1 The *market prices* determined by the *real-time market schedule* provided by the *IESO* used for the *settlement* of a *boundary entity* associated with an *intertie metering point* will sometimes deviate from:
  - in the case of an import transaction not scheduled in the <u>constrained schedule from</u> the <u>pre-dispatchschedule</u> of record, its accepted offer prices in the <u>pre-dispatch</u> market schedule (the "projected market schedule") in ways that, based on the realtime dispatch process, imply a change to market participant 'k's net operating profits relative to the operating profits implied by the <u>pre-dispatch market schedule</u> for that boundary entity; or
  - in the case of an import transaction scheduled in the constrained schedule from the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record, its accepted offer prices in the constrained schedule in the schedulepre-dispatch of record in ways that, based on the real-time dispatch process, imply a change to market participant 'k's net operating profits relative to the operating profits implied by the constrained schedule in the pre-dispatchschedule of record for that boundary entity.

When this occurs but subject to section 3.8A.3, *market participant* 'k' associated with that *boundary entity* for *settlement hour* 'h' shall receive as compensation:

3.8A.1.1 in the case of an import transaction not scheduled in the *predispatchschedule* of record, a real-time intertie offer guarantee (RT\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>) settlement credit for the import of *energy* into the *IESOadministered markets* equal to the cumulative losses resulting from a negative change in implied operating profits over the course of each *settlement hour*, resulting from such *settlement*, calculated in accordance with section 3.8A.2; or

3.8A.1.2 in the case of an import transaction scheduled in the *pre dispatchschedule* of record, the real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit (RT\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>) or <u>the</u> day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit (DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>) for the import of *energy* into the *IESO administered markets* equal to the cumulative losses resulting from a negative change in implied operating profits over the course of each *settlement hour*, resulting from such *settlement*, calculated in accordance with section 3.8A.2 or 3.8A.2<u>B</u> as the case may be.

#### **Real-Time Intertie Offer Guarantee**

3.8A.2 The real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' ("RT\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>") shall be determined by the following equation:

Let OP(P,Q,B) be a profit function of Price (P), Quantity (Q) and an N by 2 matrix (B) of *price-quantity pairs*:

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s^*} P_n \cdot (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) - (Q - Q_{s^*}) \cdot P_{s^* + 1}$$

Using matrix notation for parameter 'B' this may be expressed as follows :

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s} [B[n,1] \cdot (B[n,2] - B[n-1,2])] - [(Q - B[s^*,2]) \cdot B[s^*+1,1]]$$

Where:

s\* is the highest indexed row of B such that  $Q_{s*} \le Q \le Q_n$  and where,  $Q_0=0$ 

'P' is EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: the real-time 5-minute *energy market price* at the applicable *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

'Q' is  $MQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}$ : the market quantity scheduled for injection in the *market schedule* by *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' in *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

'B' is matrix  $BE_{k,h}^{i,t}$  of N price-quantity pairs offered by market participant 'k' to supply energy from a particular boundary entity associated with an intertie metering point <u>'i'</u> in the IESO-administered markets, during <u>metering interval 't' of</u> settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by offered price where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

Using the terms below, let  $RT\_IOG_{k,h}$  be expressed as follows:

$$RT\_IOG_{k,h} = EIM_{k,h}$$

Where:

 $EIM_{k,h}$  represents that component of the real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit for *market participant* 'k' during *settlement hour* 'h' attributable to import of *energy* into the *IESO-administered markets* at all relevant *intertie metering points* 'i' in accordance with the rationale referred to in section 3.8A.1 and is calculated as follows:

$$\text{EIM}_{k,h} = \sum_{I} (-1) \bullet \text{MIN} \left[ 0, \sum_{T} \text{OP}(\text{EMP}_{h}^{i,t}, \text{MQSI}_{k,h}^{i,t}, \text{BE}) \right]$$

Such that:

I is the set of all relevant intertie metering points 'i'

T is the set of all *metering intervals* 't' in *settlement hour* 'h'

EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> is the real-time 5-minute *energy market price* at the applicable *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

# Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee

- 3.8A.2A <u>The day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credit for market</u> participant 'k' for settlement hour 'h' ("DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>") shall be determined for import transactions that are not part of a day-ahead linked wheel.
- 3.8A.2B The day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' ("DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub>") shall be determined by the following equation:

**PDRDA\_BE**<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> is the offer matrix of N price-quantity pairs for the eligible import transaction scheduled in the <u>pre-dispatchschedule</u> of record for market participant 'k' during metering interval 't' for settlement hour 'h' at intertie metering point 'i' arranged in ascending order by offered price where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

Let OP(P,Q,B) be a profit function of Price (P), Quantity (Q) and an N by 2 matrix (B) of *price-quantity pairs*:

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s^*} P_n \cdot (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) - (Q - Q_{s^*}) \cdot P_{s^*+1}$$

Using matrix notation for parameter 'B' this may be expressed as follows :

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s} [B[n,1] \cdot (B[n,2] - B[n-1,2])] - [(Q - B[s^*,2]) \cdot B[s^*+1,1]]$$

Where:

s\* is the highest indexed row of B such that  $Q_{s*} \le Q \le Q_n$  and where,  $Q_0=0$ 

'P' is  $EMP_h^{i,t}$ : the real-time 5-minute *energy market price* at the applicable *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

'Q' is the minimum of:

- <u>PDRDA\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub></u><sup>i,t</sup>: the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record constrained quantity scheduled for injection by *market participant* 'k' for an import transaction at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'; or
- DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: the real-time constrained quantity scheduled for injection by *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h';

'B' is matrix <u>PDRDA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub></u><sup>i,t</sup>: *energy offers* submitted into the *predispatchschedule* of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price-quantity pair* where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2;

such that the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee is formulated as follows:

The principles for the settlement of the day-ahead intertie offer guarantee are as follows:

- Component 1: Any shortfall in payment on the real-time import flow of the schedule of record will be based upon the real-time revenue received for that amount of energy in comparison with the costs submitted in the importer's day-ahead offer;
- 2. Component 2: For the portion of *schedule of record* that is not implemented in the realtime *dispatch* schedule, the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee will guarantee the cost incurred of arranging the import (where the real-time *offer* price is less than day ahead *offer* price) or subtract any revenue gained (where the real-time *offer* price is greater than the day-ahead *offer* price)<sup>2</sup>; and
- 3. Component 3: Any income from real-time congestion management settlement credit (CMSC) included in an importer's *schedule of record* delivered in real-time will be used to reduce the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee payment.

The Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee is calculated as follows:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Where the real-time offer is equal to the day-ahead offer, the cost/gain is equal to zero (0).

$$\underline{DA \ IOG_{k,h}} \equiv MAX \begin{bmatrix} 0, \sum_{T} (DA\_IOG\_COMP1_{k,h}^{i,t} + DA\_IOG\_COMP2_{k,h}^{i,t} \\ - DA\_IOG\_COMP3_{k,h}^{i,t}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Where:

Ι

<u>= set of all metering intervals 't' in the set of all settlement hour 'h'</u>

# Component 1

Component 1 includes any shortfall in payment on the delivered real-time *dispatch* of the *schedule of record* based upon the real-time revenue received for that amount of *energy* in comparison with the costs as represented in the importer's day-ahead *offer*. Component 1 is calculated as follows:

 $\underline{DA\_IOG\_COMP1_{k,h}}^{i,t} = \frac{As-offered day-ahead costs for the minimum of the importer's}{\frac{schedule of record}{1}} = \frac{As-offered day-ahead costs for the minimum of the importer's}{\frac{schedule of record}{1}}$ 

$$\underline{\text{DA}\_\text{IOG}\_\text{COMP1}_{k,h}}^{i,t} \equiv (-1) \times OP\left(\text{EMP}_{h}^{i,t}, \text{MIN}\left(\text{DA}\_\text{DQSI}_{k,h}^{i,t}, \text{DQSI}_{k,h}^{i,t}\right), \text{DA}\_\text{BE}_{k,h}^{i,t}\right)$$

# Component 2

If, as a result of economic selection, a portion of the *schedule of record* is not implemented in the real-time *dispatch* schedule, the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee:

- Guarantees the cost of arranging the delivery if the real-time *offer* is less than the dayahead *offer*; or
- Subtracts any gain where the real-time *offer* is greater than the day-ahead *offer*.

If there are no real-time *energy offers* submitted by the *market participant* for any portion of the day-ahead constrained schedule, the real-time *energy offers* for that portion of *energy* will be set to MMCP (*Maximum Market Clearing Price*) for the purposes of calculating Component 2.

If the real-time *energy offers* for any portion of the day-ahead constrained schedule is below \$0.00 \$/MWh (i.e. negative), the real-time *energy offers* for that portion of *energy* will be set to \$0.00 \$/MWh for the purposes of calculating Component 2.

Component 2 is calculated as follows:

<u>DA IOG COMP2<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> =</u> <u>As-offered day-ahead costs for the difference between:</u>

• the minimum of the importer's schedule of record quantity,

or the real-time constrained schedule; and

• the minimum of the importer's schedule of record quantity.

over the interval minus all real-time *energy offers* (with a minimum limit of zero) over the interval for that amount of *energy* 

$$\frac{DA\_IOG}{COMP2_{k,h}} \equiv XDA\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t}-MAX(0,XBE_{k,h}^{i,t})$$

Where:

<u>Let  $XBE_{k,h}^{i,t}$  be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x</u> matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=p^*}^{s^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{s^*}) \times P_{s^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is *energy offers* submitted in real-time, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

Let XDA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=c^*}^{d^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{d^*}) \times P_{d^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is *energy offers* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

$$\underline{c^*} \qquad = \frac{\text{the highest indexed row of matrix XDA}_{BE_{k,h}^{i,t}} \text{ such that } Q_{c^*} \leq \\ \underline{min[DA}_{DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}}, \underline{DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}}, ] \leq Q_n \text{ and where } Q_{c^*-1} = \\ \underline{min[DA}_{DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}}, \underline{DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}}, ] \text{ and where if } Q_{c^*} < Q_{c^*-1}, \text{ let } Q_{c^*} = Q_{c^*-1} \end{cases}$$

d\* 
$$\equiv$$
 the highest indexed row of matrix XDA\_BE<sub>kh</sub>, t such that Q<sub>d\*</sub> 

# $\underline{DA}\underline{DQSI}_{\underline{k},\underline{h}}^{i,t} \leq \underline{Q}_{\underline{n}}$

$$\underline{p^*} \equiv \frac{\text{the highest indexed row of matrix XBE}_{k,h}^{i,t} \text{ such that } Q_{p^*} \leq}{\min[DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}] \leq Q_n \text{ and where } Q_{p^*-1}} =} \\ \underline{min[DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}]}_{\min[DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}]} \text{ and where if } Q_{p^*} < Q_{p^*-1}, \text{ let } Q_{p^*} = Q_{p^*-1}}$$

$$\equiv \frac{\text{the highest indexed row of matrix XBE}_{k,h} \text{ i.t such that } Q_{s^*} \leq \frac{DA \ DQSI_{k,h} \text{ i.t} \leq Q_n}{DA \ DQSI_{k,h} \text{ i.t} \leq Q_n}$$

# Component 3

s\*

- The DA-IOG payment for an import will be reduced by the income received from real time *congestion management settlement credit* (CMSC) for the importer's *schedule of* record delivered in real-time.
- The importer's *schedule of record* will be measured against both the real-time constrained schedule and the real-time unconstrained schedule to determine the amount of revenue from CMSC that should be included in the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee calculation.
- For any interval, there are six possible orderings of the amount of an importer's capacity that may be included in the *schedule of record*, the real-time unconstrained schedule and the real-time constrained schedule. Table 0-1: Ordering of Importer's Capacity and Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Component 3 summarizes the six possible orderings and the inclusion of Component 3 in the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee calculation.
- For the purposes of determining the applicable CMSC in Component 3, the offer *price* is subject to Section 3.5.6.

<u>Scenario</u>	Ordering	Component 3 - CMSC Included?
<u>1</u>	$\underline{DQSI} \ge \underline{MQSI} \ge \underline{DA}\underline{DQSI}$	N
<u>2</u>	$MQSI \ge DQSI \ge DA_DQSI$	N
<u>3</u>	<u>DQSI &gt; DA_DQSI &gt; MQSI</u>	Y (Partial CMSC)
<u>4</u>	<u>MQSI &gt; DA_DQSI &gt; DQSI</u>	Y (Partial CMSC)
<u>5</u>	$DA_DQSI >= DQSI > MQSI$	Y (All CMSC)
<u>6</u>	$DA_DQSI \ge MQSI \ge DQSI$	Y (All CMSC)

# Table 0-1: Ordering of Importer's Capacity and Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Component 3

Component 3 is calculated as follows :

 $\underline{DA\_IOG}_{\underline{COMP3}_{\underline{k},\underline{h}}}^{\underline{i},\underline{t}}$ 

Income received from real time congestion management settlement credits (CMSC) for the importer's *schedule of record* delivered in

# real-time over the interval

Component 3 is only calculated when the real-time CMSC for the same interval is a value other than zero.

# <u>Scenario 1</u>

$$\underline{\underline{DA\_IOG}}_{\underline{COMP3}_{\underline{k},\underline{h}}} \underline{\underline{i},\underline{t}} \equiv \underline{0}$$

# Scenario 2

\_

$$\underline{\underline{DA\_IOG}}_{\underline{COMP3_{k,h}}i:t} \equiv \underline{0}$$

# <u>Scenario 3</u>

$$\underline{\underline{DA} \underline{IOG}}_{\underline{COMP3}_{k,h}} \equiv OP\left(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, MQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, BE_{k,h}^{i,t}\right) - OP\left(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, DA_{DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}}, BE_{k,h}^{i,t}\right)$$

# <u>Scenario 4</u>

$$\underline{\frac{DA\_IOG}{COMP3_{k,h}}} \equiv OP\left(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, BE_{k,h}^{i,t}\right) - OP\left(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, BE_{k,h}^{i,t}\right)$$

# <u>Scenario 5</u>

$$\frac{\text{DA IOG}}{\text{COMP3}_{k,h}} \equiv \frac{\text{Congestion management settlement credit calculated as per Section}}{3.5.}$$

# Scenario 6

$$\underline{\text{DA IOG}}_{\underline{\text{COMP3}_{k,h}}} \equiv \frac{\text{Congestion management settlement credit calculated as per Section}}{3.5.}$$

 $DA\_IOG_{k,h}$  (for all intertie metering points) =

-1 x MINIMUM of:

Zero or

[The sum of all revenues implied by each import transaction valued at the real-time energy market price in the applicable intertie zone times the minimum of the quantity scheduled for injection in the pre dispatch of record or the real time schedule
Those costs represented through the <i>offers</i> submitted by the <i>market participant</i> for the import transaction scheduled in the <i>pre-dispatch of record</i> .]
That component of the real-time congestion management <i>settlement</i> credit <i>settlement</i> applicable to the same import transaction.]
In circumstances other than those where the import transaction is subsequently subject to a <i>constrained-on event</i> in the <i>real-time market</i> :
$DA\_IOG_{k,h} = \sum_{I} (-1) \bullet MIN \left[0, \sum_{T} \left[OP(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, MIN(PDR\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}), PDR\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t})\right] + OPE_{k,h}^{i,t}\right]$
where:
'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'
"T' is the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h'
OPE <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> is that component of the congestion management settlement credit settlement amount (CMSC) for market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' for settlement hour 'h' as defined in section 3.5.2.
In circumstances where the import transaction is subsequently subject to a constrained-on event in the real-time market:
$DA\_IOG_{k,h} = \sum_{i} (-1) \bullet MIN\left[0, \sum_{T} \left[OP(EM_{h}^{p,i}, MIN(PDR\_DSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}), PDR\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t})\right] + OPE\left\{adj_{k,h}^{i,t}, bdistantial equation is a structure of the structure of t$
where:
'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'.
"T' is the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h'
OPE {adj} <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> is an adjusted component of the congestion management <i>settlement</i> credit <i>settlement amount</i> (CMSC) for <i>market participant</i> 'k' at <i>intertie metering</i> <i>point</i> 'i' for <i>settlement hour</i> 'h' in which the constrained schedule is the lesser of PDR_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> or DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> but in all instances, greater than or equal to MQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> such that it is formulated as follows:

$$\underline{OPE\{adj\}_{k,h}^{i} = \sum_{t} \left[ \begin{array}{c} OP(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, MQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, BE) - \\ OP(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, MAX(MQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, (MIN(PDR_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}))), BE) \end{array} \right]$$

Until the *IESO* has the software capability to report  $DA\_IOG_{k5h}$  settlement amounts pertaining to import transactions that are subject to a *constrained-on event* in the *real-time market* (i.e. using the variable OPE {adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) on settlements statements for the *trading day* in which they were incurred, the *IESO* shall:

- report such *settlement amounts* or any required adjustments to DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub> *settlement amounts* in a manner and schedule determined in the applicable *market manual;* and
- recover such *settlement amounts* in a manner and schedule determined in the applicable *market manual*.

The *IESO* shall give *market participants* 5 days notice of when such software capability will be put into service.

#### Real-Time and Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Settlement-Credit Offset

- 3.8A.3 The cumulative real-time intertie offer guarantee settlement credits and the cumulative day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credits payable to a market participant for any and all applicable settlement hours in the real-time market for an energy billing period shall be adjusted by the IESO in accordance with section 3.8A.4 to nullify such credits where:
  - 3.8A.3.1 that *market participant* has submitted one or more *energy offers* and one or more *energy bids* as contemplated by section 3.5.8.1 of Chapter 7 for the same *dispatch interval*; or
  - 3.8A.3.2 the *market assessment unit* has determined that the *market participant* has an agreement or arrangement to share the *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit with one or more other *market participants* and they have submitted one or more *energy offers* and one or more *energy bids* as contemplated by section 3.5.8.1 of Chapter 7 for the same *dispatch interval*; or
  - 3.8A.3.3 the *market participant* has one or more import transactions in the *predispatchschedule* of record at an *intertie metering point* and where:
    - it has not been determined by the *IESO* or demonstrated by the *market participant* to the satisfaction of the *IESO* in the manner described in the applicable *market manual*, that the import transaction scheduled in the *pre-dispatch of record* has a financially-binding status in the neighbouring *control area* that is the source of the transaction;

- the same import transaction is subsequently scheduled in the corresponding *metering interval* of the corresponding *settlement hour* in the *real-time market*; and
- the *market participant* submits one or more <u>schedule of record</u> and/or real-time *energy bids* as contemplated by section 3.5.8.1 of Chapter 7 for the same *dispatch interval*;

and, at least one of such energy offers and one of such energy bids is scheduled.

- For certainty, any *market participant* shall have recourse to the dispute resolution provisions of section 2 of Chapter 3 if it believes that the *market assessment unit* did not have reasonable grounds for making the determination that the *market participant* had any such agreement or arrangement with another *market participant* as described in section 3.8A.3.2.
- 3.8A.4 The combined day-ahead and real-time *intertie offer* guarantees and intertie offer guarantee settlement credit offset ("IOG Offset") process is as follows. Any adjustment made by the IESO under section 3.8A.3 shall be applied with respect to any export transaction in the *market schedule* for *market participant* 'k' in each settlement hour 'h' for which market participant 'k' is entitled to receive a real-time or day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit meeting the conditions set out in section 3.8A.3. The total amount offset shall be limited by the cumulative quantity of the export transactions expressed in the market schedule for that settlement hour and shall not exceed the total combined real-time and day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credits received for the settlement hour. Where the cumulative quantity of the export transactions expressed in the *market schedule* for the settlement hour is less than the cumulative quantity of imports triggering real-time and day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credits for that same settlement hour, the real-time and day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credits will be offset in ascending order from the import transaction with the smallest real-time and/or smallest day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement rate to the import transaction attracting the largest real-time and/or largest day-ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement rate and only up until the point at which the total quantity of import transactions equals the total quantity of export transactions, and may be expressed as described in the general rule that follows.

The offset process described in this section shall apply to:

- real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credits meeting the criteria of section 3.8A.3.1; or
- real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credits or day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credits meeting the criteria of section 3.8A.3.3.

For the purposes of this calculation all applicable real-time or day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credits meeting the criteria described above, attributable to *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' shall be arranged in ascending order

by rate (dollars per megawatt per transaction), and subject to the following decision rules:

- a. Where a day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit and a real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit are associated with the same import transaction, the larger of the two *settlement amounts* will be included in order to reflect the fact that *market participant* 'k' is entitled to receive the higher of these two *settlement amounts* pursuant to section 3.8A.1;[Intentionally left blank section deleted]
- b. Where a day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit is associated with the import transaction, but no real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit was applicable, the day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement credit* will be included;
- c. Where a real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit is associated with the import transaction, but no day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit is applicable, the real-time *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit will be included;

The ordering of these *settlement amounts* is described in terms of a general rule as follows:

Let  $MI_{kh}$  [N,13] be an N by 13 matrix of N pairs of import quantities scheduled for injection by market participant 'k' in the real-time dispatch schedule and/or the constrained schedule from the EDAC schedule of record in the settlement hour 'h' (DA  $DQSI_{k,h}^{i}$  and/or  $DQSI_{k,h}^{i}$  as the case may be) paired with the corresponding day-ahead intertie offer guarantee, the component of the real-time *intertie offer* guarantee settlement credit, DA-IOG rate, RT-IOG rate, DA Offset DQSW, DA-Offset Flag, Settlement rate, (gross) IOG\$, RT Offset DQSW, IOG Offset \$, (net) IOG \$ for all *intertie metering points* 'i' arranged in ascending order by settlement rate in each row. Columns 1 through 4 are original inputs to the matrix, while columns 5 through 13 are derived N by 2 matrix of N pairs of import quantities scheduled for injection by market participant 'k' in the real-time market schedule or the constrained schedule from the pre dispatch schedule of record in metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' (MQSI<sub>kh</sub><sup>i,i</sup>, DQSI<sub>kh</sub><sup>i,i</sup>, or PDRDA DQSI<sub>kh</sub><sup>i,i</sup> as the case may be) paired with the corresponding component of the real-time *intertic offer* guarantee settlement credit (or day-ahead intertie offer guarantee as the case may be) for all intertie metering points 'i' arranged in ascending order by the real-time intertie offer guarantee or day-ahead intertie offer guarantee in each row.

# The general rule is as follows:

Event Type	Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>t</sup> - [Row 'n', Column 1]	Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>t</sup> <del>[Row 'n', Column</del> <del>2]</del>
General Rule	MQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> , or MIN (PDR_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> , DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> ) associated with the settlement amount selected in column 2 as illustrated in the table below.	$\begin{split} & \underbrace{MI_{k,h}}^{t} \underbrace{[n,2]}_{} = \underline{MAX} \underbrace{(RT\_IOG_{k,h}}^{i,t}; \\ & \underbrace{DA\_IOG_{k,h}}^{i,t}) \\ & \underbrace{Subject to:}_{} \\ & \underbrace{MI_{k,h}}^{t} \underbrace{[n,2]}_{} \ge \underline{MI}_{k,h}}^{t} \underbrace{[n-1,2]}_{} \\ & \underbrace{MI_{k,h}}^{t} \underbrace{[1,2]}_{} = \underline{MIN} \underbrace{[MI_{k,h}}^{t} \underbrace{[1 to}_{} \\ & \underbrace{N,2]]}_{} \end{split}$

The outcomes from the general rule are as follows:

Event Type	Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> t-[Row 'n', Column 1]	Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>t</sup> [Row 'n', Column 2]
A real-time import transaction not arranged in the day- ahead commitment process meeting the criteria of section 3.8A.3.1	MQSL <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>	RT_IOG- <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>
Day-ahead import transaction without financially-binding status and a corresponding real- time import transaction with a real-time intertie offer guarantee that is greater than the day- ahead intertie offer guarantee meeting the criteria of section 3.8A.3.3	MQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>	RT_IOG <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,†</sup>
Day-ahead import transaction without financially-binding status and a corresponding real- time import transaction with a real-time intertie offer guarantee that is less than the day-ahead intertie offer guarantee meeting the criteria of	MIN (PDR_DQSL <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> , DQSL <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> )	DA_IOG <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>

Event Type Ma	latrix MI <sub>kh</sub> <sup>‡</sup> [Row 'n', Column 1]	Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>t</sup> [Row 'n', Column 2]
section 3.8A.3.3		

# -<u>The general rules to settle IOG are as follows:</u>

Note:  $MI_{k,h}$  [N,13] matrix has been transposed such that the columns are on the rows.

Note: $MI_{k,h}$ [N,13] matrix has been transpos	ed such that the contains are on the rows.
Event Type	General Rule
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 1]	$\underline{DA\_DQSI_{k,h}}^{i}$
	Associated with the settlement amount in column 3
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 2]	$\underline{DQSI_{k,h}}^{\underline{i}}$
	Associated with the settlement amount in column 3 and 4
Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 3]	<u>DA_IOG_k,h</u> <sup>i</sup>
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 4]	<u>RT_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 5]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}[n,5]} \{\underline{DA}\_\underline{IOG}\_\underline{RATE}_{k,h}^{i}\} =$
	$\underline{DA\_IOG_{k,h}}^{i} / \underline{MIN}(\underline{DA\_DQSI_{k,h}}^{i}, \underline{DQSI_{k,h}}^{i})$
Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 6]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}[n,6] \{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}\}} =$
	$\underline{RT\_IOG_{k,h}}^{i} / \underline{DQSI_{k,h}}^{i}$
Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 7]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}[n,7] \{ DA \text{ OFFSET } DQSW_{k,h}^{i} \}}$
Matrix MI <sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 8]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}[n,8] \{ DA OFFSET FLAG_{k,h}! \}} = "Y" or "N"$
	Such that:
	<u>DA OFFSET FLAG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> = "Y"</u>
	when
	$\frac{\{DA \text{ OFFSET } DQSW_{kh}^{i}\} \ge 50\% \text{ of}}{MIN\{DA\_DQSI_{kh}^{i}, DQSI_{kh}^{i}\}}$
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 9]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}[n,9]} \{\underline{IOG\_SETTLEMENT\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}} =$
	<u><b>RT_IOG_RATE</b>_k,h</u> if <b>DA_OFFSET_FLAG</b> _kh <sup>i</sup> = "Y";
	$\underline{MI_{k,h}}^{i}[n,9] \{\underline{IOG}\_\underline{SETTLEMENT}\_\underline{RATE_{k,h}}^{i}\} =$ $\underline{MAXIDA}\_\underline{IOG}\_\underline{PATE}\_^{i}\_\underline{PT}\_\underline{IOG}\_\underline{PATE}\_^{i}];f$
	$\frac{MAX[DA\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}, RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}] if}{DA\_OFFSET\_FLAG_{k,h}^{i} = "N";}$
	Subject to:
	<u><math>MI_{k,h}[n,9] \ge MI_{k,h}[n-1,9];</math></u>

	$\frac{MI_{k,h} [1,9] = MIN[MI_{k,h} [1 \text{ to } N,9]];}{[MI_{k,h} [1 \text{ to } N,9]] <> 0}$
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 10]	$\underline{MI_{k,h}^{i}[n,10] \{IOG\}_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \\ \underline{the DA\_IOG}_{k,h}^{i} \text{ or } RT\_IOG\}_{k,h}^{i} \text{ associated with the} \\ \underline{Settlement Rate_{k,h}^{i}(i.e. RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i} \text{ or} \\ \underline{MAX}(DA\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i} RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}))$
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 11]	MI <sub>k,h</sub> [n,11] {RT_OFFSET_DQSW <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> }
Matrix MI <sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 12]	<u>MI<sub>k,h</sub> [n,12] {IOG_OFFSET<sub>k,h</sub>i }</u>
Matrix MI <sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 13]	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,13] \{Net\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}\}}{MI_{k,h}[n,10] \{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\} - MI_{k,h}^{i}[n,12] \\ \frac{\{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}{\{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}$

The outcomes from the general rules are as follows

	A	B	<u>C</u>	D
Event Type	An import transaction scheduled day ahead receiving a DA-IOG but no RT-IOG and is not offset Day Ahead	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled day</u> <u>ahead receiving a</u> <u>DA-IOG but no</u> <u>RT-IOG and is</u> <u>offset Day Ahead</u>	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled only in</u> <u>the real-time and</u> <u>receiving a RT-</u> <u>IOG but no DA-</u> <u>IOG</u>	An import transaction scheduled both in the day ahead and in the real-time receiving DA-IOG and RT-IOG.
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 1]</u>	<u>DA_DQSI<sub>k.h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	<u>DA_DQSI<sub>k.h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	NULL	<u>DA_DQSI<sub>k.h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>
<u>Matrix MI<sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 2]</u>	<u>DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	<u>DQSI<sub>k.h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	<u>DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	$\underline{DQSI_{k,h}}^{i}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 3]</u>	$\underline{DA\_IOG_{k,h}}^{i}$	<u>DA_IOG<sub>k.h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	$\frac{DA\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}}{= NULL}$	<u>DA_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>
<u>Matrix MI<sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 4]</u>	$\frac{\text{RT}\_\text{IOG}_{k,h}{}^{i}}{= \text{NULL}}$	$\frac{\text{RT}_{\text{IOG}_{k,h}}^{i}}{= \text{NULL}}$	<u>RT_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></u>	$\frac{\text{RT}\_\text{IOG}_{k,h}^{i}}{= \text{NULL}}$
Matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub>	{DA_IOG_RATE <sub>k</sub>	{DA_IOG_RATE	NULL	{DA_IOG_RATE

	A	B	<u>C</u>	D
Event Type	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled day</u> <u>ahead receiving a</u> <u>DA-IOG but no</u> <u>RT-IOG and is not</u> <u>offset Day Ahead</u>	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled day</u> <u>ahead receiving a</u> <u>DA-IOG but no</u> <u>RT-IOG and is</u> <u>offset Day Ahead</u>	An import transaction scheduled only in the real-time and receiving a RT- IOG but no DA- IOG	An import transaction scheduled both in the day ahead and in the real-time receiving DA-IOG and RT-IOG.
[Row 'n', Column 5]	<u>h</u> i}	<u>k,h<sup>i</sup>}</u>		<u>k,h<sup>i</sup>}</u>
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 6]</u>	$\frac{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h} \\ i\}=}{NULL}$	$\frac{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_k\\ \underline{h}\}=}{NULL}$	$\frac{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}}{i} =$	$\frac{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_k\\ \underline{h}\} =}{\underline{NULL}}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 7]</u>	$\frac{\{\text{DA OFFSET DQS}\\ \underline{W}_{k,h^i}\} = 0$	$\frac{\{\text{DA OFFSET DQ}\\ \underline{SW_{kh^i}}\} > 0$	NULL	$\frac{\{DA \text{ OFFSET } DQ \\ \underline{SW}_{kh^i}\} \ge 0$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 8]</u>	$\frac{\{\text{DA OFFSET FLA} \\ \overline{G_{k,h}^i}\} = "N"$	$\frac{\{\text{DA OFFSET FLA} \\ \overline{G_{k,h}^i}\} = "Y"$	NULL	$\frac{\{\text{DA OFFSET FLA} \\ G_{k,h}^{i}\} = "Y" \text{ or "N"}}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 9]</u>	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,9]}{\{IOG\_SETTLEME}$ $\underline{NT\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \frac{\{DA\_IOG\_RATE_{k,k}^{i}\}}{\frac{h}{2}}$	NULL	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,9]}{\{IOG\_SETTLEME}$ $\frac{NT\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}\} = \frac{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}\}}{\frac{i}{2}}$	$\begin{array}{l} \underline{MI_{k,h}}[n,9] \\ \underline{\{IOG\_SETTLEM} \\ \underline{ENT\_RATE_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \\ \underline{\{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k} \\ \underline{h}^{i}\} \text{ or} \\ \underline{MAX}(DA\_IOG\_R \\ \underline{ATE_{k,h}^{i}}, \\ \underline{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}} \\ \underline{RT\_IOG\_RATE_{k,h}} \\ \underline{i} \\ \end{array}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 10]</u>	$\frac{MI_{k,h} [n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\}} =$ <u>the DA_IOG\\$_{k,h}^{i}</u>	NULL	$\frac{MI_{k,h} [n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\}} =$ <u>the RT_IOG\\$_{k,h}^{i}</u>	$\frac{MI_{k,h} [n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \frac{\{RT\_IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\} \text{ or }}{MAX(DA\_IOG\$_{k,h}^{i})}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k.h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 11]</u>	$\frac{\underline{MI}_{k,h}[n,11]}{\{\underline{RT} \ OFFSET \ DQS} \\ \underline{W}_{k,h^{i}} \} \ge 0$	NULL	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,11]}{\{RT \text{ OFFSET DQS} \\ \underline{W}_{k,h^{i}}\} \ge 0}$	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,11]}{\{RT \text{ OFFSET DQ} \\ \underline{SW}_{k,h^{i}}\} \ge 0}$
<u>Matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> [Row 'n', Column 12]</u>	$\frac{\underline{MI_{k,h} [n, 12]}}{\{\underline{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^i}\}} \ge 0$	NULL	$\frac{\underline{MI_{k,h}}[n,12]}{\{\underline{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}}\}} \ge 0$	$\frac{\underline{MI_{k,h} [n, 12]}}{\{\underline{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}}\}} \ge 0$

	A	B	<u>C</u>	D
Event Type	An import transaction scheduled day ahead receiving a DA-IOG but no RT-IOG and is not offset Day Ahead	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled day</u> <u>ahead receiving a</u> <u>DA-IOG but no</u> <u>RT-IOG and is</u> offset Day Ahead	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled only in</u> <u>the real-time and</u> <u>receiving a RT-</u> <u>IOG but no DA-</u> <u>IOG</u>	<u>An import</u> <u>transaction</u> <u>scheduled both in</u> <u>the day ahead and</u> <u>in the real-time</u> <u>receiving DA-IOG</u> <u>and RT-IOG.</u>
<u>Matrix MI<sub>kh</sub> [Row 'n', Column 13]</u>	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,13]}{\{Net\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \frac{MI_{k,h}[n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\} - MI_{k,h}[n,12]} \\ \frac{\{IOG OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}{\{IOG OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}$	NULL	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,13]}{\{Net\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}\}} = \frac{MI_{k,h}[n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h}^{i}\} - MI_{k,h}[n,12]} \\ \frac{\{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}{\{IOG \ OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}\}}$	$\frac{MI_{k,h}[n,13]}{\{Net\_IOG_{k,h^{i}}\}} = \frac{MI_{k,h}[n,10]}{\{IOG\$_{k,h^{i}}\} - MI_{k,h}[n,12]}$ $\frac{\{IOG OFFSET_{k,h^{i}}\}}{\{IOG OFFSET_{k,h^{i}}\}}$

The Day-Ahead IOG rate (DA\_IOG RATE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) column 5, at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' is calculated using the day ahead constrained import schedule value in columns 1 (DA\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and real time import schedule value in column 2 (DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and the DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> value in Column 3 of each unique row 'n' in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> as follows:

<u>DA_IOG RATE<sub>k.h</sub>i</u>	=	$IF \left[ DA\_IOG_{k,h}^{i} \text{ is not NULL}, \frac{DA\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}}{MIN(DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i})}, 0 \right]$
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The Real-Time IOG rate (RT\_IOG\_RATE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) column 6 at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' is calculated using the real-time constrained import schedule of column 2 and the RT\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> value of Column 4 of each unique row 'n' in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> as follows:

<u>RT_IOG RATE<sub>kh</sub>i</u>	≡	$IF\left[RT\_IOG_{k,h}^{i} \text{ is not NULL}, \frac{RT\_IOG_{k,h}^{i}}{DQSI_{k,h}^{i}}, 0\right]$
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<u>The matrix is arranged in ascending order on DA\_IOG\_RATE<sub>k,h</sub> (Column 5) from the lowest rate to the highest rate.</u>

The day-ahead export schedule quantity offset by *market participant* 'k' at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' (DA\_OFFSET\_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) column 7 is calculated using the day ahead constrained import schedule value in columns 1 (DA\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>), real time import schedule value in column 2 (DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and the day ahead constrained export schedule value for the market participant for an hour as follows:

<u>DA DQSW REM<sub>kh</sub></u>	=	$\left[ MAX \left[ 0, \left( \sum_{i=1}^{I} DA_DQSW_{k,h}^{I} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} DA_OFFSET_DQSW_{k,h}^{i} \right) \right] \right]$
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DA_OFFSET_DQSW <sub>k,h</sub> i	Ξ	$MIN[DA_DQSI_{k,h}^i, DQSI_{k,h}^i, DA_DQSW\_REM_{k,h}]$
---------------------------------	---	--

Where:

Ī		set of all intertie metering points 'i'	
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<u>n</u>	=	The number of day ahead import transactions with DA_OFFSET_DQSW at each pass.
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The day-ahead IOG offset flag (DA\_OFFSET FLAG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>) column 8 at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' is calculated using the values in column 7 DA\_OFFSET\_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>, columns 1 (DA\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and real time import schedule value in column 2 (DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) of each unique row 'n' in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> as follows:

DA_OFFSET_FLAG k.h <sup>i</sup>	=	$IF\left(DA_{OFFSET_{DQSW}}_{k,h}^{i} > [50\% \times MIN(DA_{DQSI}_{k,h}^{i}, DQSI_{k,h}^{i})], Y, N\right)$
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<u>The IOG offset rate (IOG SETTLEMENT RATE<sub>k,h</sub>) column 9 at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' is calculated using the values in Column 5 (DA IOG RATE<sub>k,h</sub>) and Column 6 (RT IOG RATE<sub>k,h</sub>) of each unique row 'n' in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub> as follows:</u>

IOG SETTLEMENT RATE <sub>k.h</sub> i	=	IF[DA_OFFSET_FLAG=Y,RT_IOG_RATE <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> , MAX(RT_IOG_RATE <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> ,DA_IOG_RATE <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> )]
		Subject to: $\underline{MI_{k,h}}[n,9] \ge \underline{MI_{k,h}}[n-1,9];$ $\underline{MI_{k,h}}[1,9] = \underline{MIN}[\underline{MI_{k,h}}[1 \text{ to } N,9]];$ $\underline{[MI_{k,h}}[1 \text{ to } N,9]] <> 0$

The IOG dollar amount (IOG $_{kh^i}$ ) column 10 at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' is the IOG dollar amount associated with the rate used in Column 9 (IOG\_SETTLEMENT\_RATE\_{kh^i}).

The matrix is arranged in ascending order of (IOG\_SETTLEMENT\_RATE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) (Column 9) from the lowest rate to the highest rate.

The real-time export schedule quantity offset by *market participant* 'k' at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *settlement hour* 'h' (RT\_OFFSET\_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) column 11 is calculated using the real-time constrained import schedule values in column 2 (DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and the real time constrained export schedule value for the market participant for an hour as follows:

Т

<u>RT_DQSW_REM<sub>k.h</sub></u>	≡	$\left[ MAX \left[ 0, \left( \sum_{i=1}^{I} DQSW_{k,h}^{i} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} RT_{OFFSET_{DQSW_{k,h}}^{i}} \right) \right] \right]$		
<u>RT_OFFSET_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub></u>	i	$MIN[DQSI_{k,h}^{i}, RT_DQSW_REM_{k,h}]$		
Where:				
I	=	set of all intertie metering points 'i'		
<u>n</u>	Ξ	The number of real time import transactions with RT_OFFSET_DQSW at each pass.		
<u>The IOG offset settlement amount for market participant 'k' at an intertie metering point 'i' in</u> <u>settlement hour 'h' (IOG_OFFSET<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) column 12 is calculated using column 9</u> ( <u>IOG_SETTLEMENT_RATE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) and column 11(RT_OFFSET_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) as follows:</u>				
<u>IOG_OFFSET<sub>k.h</sub>i</u>	Ξ	$(IOG\_SETTLEMENT\_RATE_{k,h}^{i} \times RT\_OFFSET\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i})$		
The IOG settlement amount for market participant 'k' at an intertie metering point 'i' in metering settlement hour 'h' (NET_IOG_{k,h}^{i}) column 13 is calculated using column10 (IOG $_{k,h}^{i}$ ) and column 12 (IOG_OFFSET_{k,h}^{i}) as follows:				
<u>NET_IOG<sub>k.h</sub>i</u>	=	$(IOG\$_{k,h}^{i} - IOG_OFFSET_{k,h}^{i})$		
The adjusted import schedule quantities by <i>market participant</i> 'k' at an <i>intertie metering</i> <i>point</i> 'i' in <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h' (QSI{adj} <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,†</sup> ) shall be calculated using the schedule values in column 1 of each unique row 'n' in matrix MI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>†</sup> as follows:				

$$QSI\{adj\}_{k,h}^{i,t} = MIN\left[MI_{k,h}^{t}[n,1], MAX\left[0, (\sum_{x=1}^{n} MI_{k,h}^{t}[x,1], \sum^{Y} MQSW_{k,h}^{y,t})\right]\right]$$

Where:

QSI {adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> is each quantity (and where applicable, adjusted quantity) scheduled for injection by *market participant* 'k' at an *intertie metering point* 'i' in *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' corresponding with each import quantity in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>t</sup> [row n, column 1];

'Y' is the set of all intertie metering points 'y';

Given the above, the total IOG offset *settlement amount* for *market participant* 'k' during *settlement hour* 'h' shall be derived as follows:

$$IOG_{k,h}OFFSET = \sum_{x=1}^{N} MI_{k,h}^{t}[x,2] - \sum_{I} (-1) \bullet MIN \left[ 0, \sum_{T} OP(EMP_{h}^{i,t}, QSI\{adj\}_{k,h}^{i,t}, BE_{k,h}^{i,t}, or PDR_{BE_{k,h}^{i,t}}) + \frac{\sum_{x=1}^{T} QSI\{adj\}_{k,h}^{i,t}}{\sum_{T} MI_{k,h}^{t}[n,1]} \bullet OPE_{k,h}^{i,t} \right]$$

Where:

- 'T' is the set of all metering intervals in settlement hour 'h'
- 'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'

<u>'N' is the number of rows n in matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>t</sup> [N,2];</u>

'n' is a row in the set of N rows within matrix MI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>t</sup>[N,2] corresponding to each applicable *intertie metering point* 'i'

MI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>t</sup> [N,2] is an N by 2 matrix of N pairs of import quantities scheduled for injection by market participant 'k' in the real-time market schedule or the constrained schedule from the pre-dispatch of record in metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' (MQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>, DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> or PDR\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> as the case may be) paired with the corresponding component of the real-time intertie offer guarantee settlement credit (or day ahead intertie offer guarantee as the case may be) for all intertie metering points 'i' arranged in ascending order by the settlement amount in each row.

PDR\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> are *energy offers* submitted into the *pre-dispatch of record*, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price-quantity pair* where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2 where the value  $QSI{adj}_{k,h}^{i,t}$  applies to a day ahead *intertie offer* guarantee;

-BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> is the *real time market offer* matrix of *price quantity pairs* for the eligible import transaction for *market participant* 'k' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' where the value QSI{adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> applies to a real-time *intertie offer* guarantee;

EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> is the real-time 5-minute *energy market price* at the applicable *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

OPE'<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> is a term used when the *settlement amount* in row 'n' pertains to a DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub> settlement amount and is equal to:

- OPE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>: that component of the congestion management *settlement* credit *settlement amount* (CMSC) for *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' for *settlement hour* 'h' as defined in section 3.5.2.; or
- OPE {adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>: that component of the congestion management *settlement* credit *settlement amount* (CMSC) for *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' for *settlement hour* 'h' in which the constrained schedule is the lesser of PDR\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> or DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> but in all instances, greater than or equal to MQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>;

depending on the value prescribed in the original calculation of the DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub> settlement amount in section 3.8A.2A. OP(P,Q,B) is a profit function of Price (P), Quantity (Q) and an N by 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s^*} P_n \cdot (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) - (Q - Q_{s^*}) \cdot P_{s^*+1}$$

Using matrix notation for parameter 'B' this may be expressed as follows :

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s} [B[n,1] \cdot (B[n,2] - B[n-1,2])] - [(Q - B[s^*,2]) \cdot B[s^*+1,1]]$$

Where:

s\* is the highest indexed row of B such that  $Q_{s^*} \leq Q \leq Q_{h}$  and where,  $Q_{0}=0$ 

· 'P' is EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: the real-time 5-minute *energy market price* at the applicable *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'

<u>'Q' is QSI{adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> as defined above.</u>

- 'B' is matrix  $BE_{k,h}^{i,t}$  or PDR\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> depending on whether QSI{adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> applies to a real-time *intertie offer* guarantee or a day ahead *intertie offer* guarantee respectively.

- 3.8A.5 The cumulative IOG<sub>k,h</sub>OFFSET *settlement amounts* received from *market participants* for each *real-time energy market billing period* shall be distributed to *market participants* in accordance with section 4.8.2.3.
- 3.8A.6 IOG<sub>k,h</sub>OFFSET *settlement amounts* shall be aggregated or disaggregated on *settlement statements* in such manner as shall be determined by the *IESO*.

#### **Day-Ahead Intertie Offer Guarantee Adjustments**

3.8A.7 [Intentionally left blank - section deleted] For each *market participant* that receives a constrained schedule for an import transaction in the *pre-dispatch of record*, the *IESO* shall determine a day-ahead intertie *offer* guarantee adjustment *settlement amount* (DA\_IOG {adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) for that import transaction. The day-ahead intertie offer guarantee adjustment *settlement amount* is equal to the greater of zero and:

the intertie offer guarantee floor value (IOG FV<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>) determined for that import transaction, minus

the sum of the applicable settlement amounts determined for that import transaction.

The DA\_IOG  $\{adj\}_{k,h}^{i}$  shall be formulated as follows:

<del>DA_IOG{adj}<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup></del>	=	MAX [0, IOG_FV <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> NEMSC <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup> MAX(DA_IOG <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i</sup>
		$\frac{1}{RT_{k,h}^{i}} - CMSC_{k,h}^{i}$

Where:

IOG\_FV<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> is the intertie offer guarantee floor value determined under section 3.8A.9;

NEMSC<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i-is</sup> that portion of the net *energy market settlement* credit applicable to the import transaction for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' at *intertie metering point* 'i' as determined in accordance with section 3.3.2.1;

DA\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> is that portion of the day ahead *intertie offer* guarantee *settlement* credit applicable to the import transaction for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' at *intertie metering point* 'i';

RT\_IOG<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i-</sup> is that portion of the real-time *intertic offer* guarantee *settlement* credit applicable to the import transaction for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' at *intertie metering point* 'i' as determined in accordance with section 3.8A.2; and

- CMSC<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup> is that portion of the congestion management *settlement* credit applicable to the import transaction for *market participant* 'k' for *settlement hour* 'h' at *intertie metering point* 'i' as determined in accordance with section 3.5.2.1 and specifically that component applicable to a constraint on *energy* (OPE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i</sup>).
- 3.8A.8 [Intentionally left blank section deleted] The *IESO* shall determine the *intertie offer* guarantee floor value (IOG  $FV_{kh}^{i}$ ) referred to in section 3.8A.7 from:

the day-ahead offer prices for the import transaction submitted by the market participant over the range of the pre-dispatch of record constrained quantity scheduled for that import transaction; and

*real-time offer prices* for the import transaction at the corresponding location in the corresponding *settlement hour* for any additional *energy* scheduled above and beyond the *pre-dispatch of record* constrained quantity scheduled for that import transaction:

The IOG\_FV<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i-</sup>shall be formulated as follows<sup>i-</sup>

$$IOG_{FV_{k,h}}^{i} = TERM 1 + TERM 2$$

$$TERM 1 = \sum_{n=1}^{T} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{s^{*}} \left[ DA_{B^{t}}[n,1] \cdot \left( DA_{B^{t}}[n,2] - DA_{B^{t}}[n-1,2] \right) \right] + \left[ \left( MIN(DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, PDR_{DQSI_{k,h}}^{i,t}) - DA_{B^{t}}[s^{*},2] \right) \cdot DA_{B^{t}}[s^{*}+1,1] \right] \right]$$

$$TERM2 \text{ is calculated for each metering interval 't' where PDR } DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} < DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}$$

$$\overline{\text{TERM 2}} = \sum_{n=1}^{T} \sum_{n=1}^{w^{*}} [RT_B^{t}[n,1] \cdot (RT_B^{t}[n,2] - RT_B^{t}[n-1,2])] + [(DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} - RT_B^{t}[w^{*},2]) \cdot RT_B^{t}[w^{*}+1,1]] - \sum_{n=1}^{x^{*}} [RT_B^{t}[n,1] \cdot (RT_B^{t}[n,2] - RT_B^{t}[n-1,2])] - [(PDR_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} - RT_B^{t}[x^{*},2]) \cdot RT_B^{t}[x^{*}+1,1]] - [(PDR_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} - RT_B^{t}[x^{*},2]) \cdot RT_B^{t}[x^{*}+1,1]]$$

Where:

"T' is the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h';

"DA\_B" is matrix PDR\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: energy offers submitted into the pre-dispatch of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price-quantity pair where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

'RT\_B<sup>t</sup>' is matrix BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> of N *price-quantity pairs* offered by *market participant* 'k' to supply *energy* from a particular *boundary entity* associated with an *intertie metering point* 'i' in the *IESO-administered markets*, during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by offered price where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

s\* is the highest indexed row of matrix DA\_B such that DA\_B[s\*,2]  $\leq$  MIN(DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>, PDR\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>)  $\leq$  DA\_B[N,2] and where, DA\_B[0,2]=0

w\* is the highest indexed row of matrix  $RT_B^t$  such that  $RT_B^t[w^{*,2}] \leq DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} \leq RT_B^t[N,2]$  and where,  $RT_B^t[0,2]=0$ 

x\* is the highest indexed row of matrix RT\_B<sup>t</sup> such that RT\_B<sup>t</sup>[x\*,2]  $\leq$  PDR\_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>  $\leq$  RT\_B<sup>t</sup>[N,2] and where, RT\_B<sup>t</sup>[0,2]=0

3.8A.9 [Intentionally left blank – section deleted] The *IESO* shall report the intertie offer guarantee adjustment *settlement amount* specified in section 3.8A.7 in a manner and at the times specified in the applicable *market manual*; distribute and recover such *settlement amounts* in a manner and at the times specified in the applicable *market manual*.

#### PART 5 – IESO BOARD DECISION RATIONALE

Insert Text Here



# Market Rule Amendment Proposal

#### PART 1 - MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identificatio	on No.:	n No.: MR-00349-R02				
Subject:	Enhance	Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): Settlement Guarantees				
Title:	Failure C	Charges				
Nature of Pr	roposal:	Alteration		Deletion		Addition
Chapter:	7			Appendix:		
Sections:	3.8B, 3.8D (new), 3.8E (new), 3.8F(new)					
Sub-section	s proposed	for amending:	3.8B.1, 3	3.8B.2		

#### PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY – PLEASE REFER TO MR-00349-R00

Version	<b>Reason for Issuing</b>	Version Date	
Approved Amer	ndment Publication Date:		
Approved Amer	ndment Effective Date:		

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### **Summary**

MR-00349-R02 specifies the modifications to the Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge and introduces specifications for new charges contained within the EDAC design: the day-ahead export failure charge; the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge; and the generator withdrawal charge.

#### **Background**


Please refer to MR-00349-R00.

#### **Discussion**

#### Modifications to Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge

Import transactions are scheduled in hour-ahead pre-dispatch using hour-ahead pre-dispatch price. Currently settlement failure charges for scheduled day-ahead import transactions that failed to get a schedule in whole or in part and then failed to flow in whole or in part in hour-ahead pre-dispatch are calculated based on real-time market clearing price (MCP). To better represent impacts- to the IESOadministered markets of import failures, the day-ahead failure charges, will be modified to use the hour-ahead pre-dispatch price instead of real-time MCP in the calculation. As well, a cap will be added to limit the failure charge to the impact of offer changes between day-ahead and hour-ahead predispatch. If an import fails between day-ahead and pre-dispatch, the import will be assessed a Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge. If an import fails between pre-dispatch and real-time, the import will be assessed a Real-time Import Failure Charge.

A Real-time Import Failure Charge and a Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge may be applied to the same import transaction and there will be no reversal (i.e. both charges will apply).



An import that is part of a day-ahead linked wheel cannot be assessed a Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge.

It is proposed to modify section 3.8B of Chapter 9 to reflect the modified day-ahead import failure charge.

Any proceeds collected under this modified Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge will be distributed back to the market through the Intertie Failure Charge Rebate.

#### New Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge

The day-ahead export failure charge will be closely related to the current real-time and day-ahead import transaction failure charges. The day-ahead export failure charge is assessed for exports that are scheduled day-ahead but fails to get scheduled in the hour ahead pre-dispatch. There will be retained bona fide reasons for an export to fail and provided those conditions are met no export failure charge will be applied. Similar to the day-ahead import failure charge, if there is a real-time export failure charge and a day-ahead export failure charge applied to the same export transaction, there will be no reversal (i.e. both charges will apply). If an export fails between day-ahead and pre-dispatch, the export will be assessed a Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge. If an export fails between pre-dispatch and real-time, the export will be assessed a Real-time Export Failure Charge.



Similar to the Day-Ahead Import Failure Charge, each MW in the export transaction may be assessed either a Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge or a Real-Time Export Failure Charge but will not be assessed both for the same MW.

An export that is part of a day-ahead linked wheel is not eligible for a Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge.

Any proceeds collected under this new Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge will be distributed back to the market through the Intertie Failure Charge Rebate.

It is proposed to insert a new section 3.8D in Chapter 9 of the market rules to specify the day-ahead export failure charge.

#### New Day-Ahead Linked Wheel Failure Charge

With the inclusion of day-ahead exports in EDAC, scheduling of linked wheels is available. As a result, a day-ahead linked wheel failure charge is introduced. This charge applies when the day-ahead linked wheel is not scheduled in the hour-ahead pre-dispatch and the trader does not have a bona-fide reason for the failure.

While the failure of a day-ahead linked wheel does not directly impact the energy price as do the failure of non-linked imports and export transactions, a failed linked wheel could have displaced other transactions on the interties where the wheels were scheduled a day-ahead. In other words, the failed day-ahead wheel could have created congestion that limited the scheduling of other day-ahead transactions. Thus, the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge is to be assessed based on the cost of congestion between the interties where the wheeling transactions were scheduled. This cost of congestion is calculated as the spread of the day-ahead prices and real-time prices at the interties.

When the price spread between a linked wheel's Day-Ahead intertie price and the pre-dispatch intertie price is positive, it is possible that a participant would have the incentive to allow the linked wheel transactions to fail in real-time, rather than in pre-dispatch as real-time failure charges would likely to be lower. Transactions that fail in real-time could have greater adverse impacts on reliability and the market because it is not possible to schedule other imports and exports in real-time. To remove this incentive, there will be an upper bound on the DA linked wheels failure charge to the minimum of the linked wheel failure charge and the maximum of the real-time import or export failure charge.

The formula is as follows: Min {max (0, [day-ahead price spread minus hour-ahead pre-dispatch price spread]  $\times$  [MWh failure]), [real-time import failure charge plus real-time export failure charge]}

Any proceeds collected under the new Day-Ahead Linked Wheel Failure Charge will be distributed back to the market through the Intertie Failure Charge Rebate.

It is proposed to insert a new section 3.8E in Chapter 9 of the market rules to specify the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge.

#### New Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge

A Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge for committed non-quick starts is a new charge and will be applied when these generators withdraw their commitment. If a market participant is eligible for a DA-PCG, and withdraws from the commitment in real-time then, depending on the reasons for the withdrawal, a Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge may be assessed.

Market participants must notify the IESO of an intention to withdraw. The consequence of this action is assessed as follows for application of the withdrawal charge.

If:

- the withdrawal was within the market participant's control; and
- the withdrawal fails a price test (the results of this withdrawal did not provide a benefit to the market),

then the Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge will be assessed.


The price used in the calculation of the Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge is dependent on the time the notification of withdrawal was received by the IESO:

a. If withdrawal notification is received at or before 4 hours prior to the first EDAC schedule hour in real-time (PD - 4), then the lesser of the pre-dispatch Ontario market


clearing price and the real-time market clearing price is used for every hour withdrawn. The withdrawal has to be approved and revisions to the offers completed by the start of the pre-dispatch run for PD-4 consistent with the existing data submission process described in Market Manual 4.2.

b. If withdrawal notification is received later than PD-4, then the real-time market clearing price is used for every hour withdrawn.

For example, a generator is scheduled from HE 9 to HE 19 and notifies the IESO of their withdrawal in HE13 at 07:00. The withdrawal notification is received more than 4 hours prior to the withdrawal hour in real-time, so the lesser of the pre-dispatch Ontario market clearing price and the real-time market clearing price is used for every hour withdrawn.



In the same example, if the generator notifies the IESO of their withdrawal in HE13 at 09:00, the withdrawal notification is received less than 4 hours prior to the withdrawal hour in real-time, so the real-time market clearing price is used for every hour withdrawn.



PART 3 – EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENT

If the market participant does not notify the IESO of their intent to withdraw and does not inject for the entire day-ahead scheduled period, the Generator Withdrawal Charge is assessed using the real-time market clearing price for each hour of the scheduled period.

If the market participant withdraws completely from their day-ahead schedule and the IESO removes the constraints applied to the unit, the market participant is not eligible to receive the DA-PCG. If the market participant does not notify the IESO of their intent to withdraw and does not inject for any interval in their day-ahead scheduled period, they are not eligible to receive the DA-PCG and will be assessed the withdrawal charge.

If a market participant synchronizes to the system and subsequently requests to withdraw from its commitment before the completion of its day-ahead commitment, withdrawal charges will be assessed and applied on the scheduled hours withdrawn. Any proceeds collected under the Generator Withdrawal Charge will be distributed back to the market through the new Generator Withdrawal Rebate charge.

It is proposed to insert a new section 3.8F in Chapter 9 of the market rules to specify the generator withdrawal charge.

#### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

#### **3.8B** Day Ahead Import Failure Charge

3.8B.1 The *IESO* shall apply the day-ahead import failure charge specified in section 3.8B.2 to a *market participant* for any quantity of *energy* scheduled for injection at an

*intertie metering point* in the constrained schedule<u>d</u> from in the *pre-dispatchschedule of record* where:

- 3.8B.1.1 the *market participant* fails either in whole or in part to schedule a *dispatch* quantity scheduled for injection in the constrained *realtimepre-dispatch* schedule in the corresponding *metering interval* of the corresponding *settlement hour* at the same *intertie metering point;*
- 3.8B.1.2 the *IESO* has not determined, nor has the *market participant* demonstrated to the satisfaction of the *IESO*, that the failure is due to bona fide and legitimate reasons as described in chapter 7, section 7.5.8B of these *market rules*; and

3.8B.1.3 the import transaction is not part of a day-ahead linked wheel.

3.8B.2 For all import transactions scheduled in the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record and meeting the criteria of section 3.8B.1, the day-ahead import failure charge shall be formulated as follows:

Let OP(P,Q,B) be a profit function of Price (P), Quantity (Q) and an N by 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s^*} P_n \cdot (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) - (Q - Q_{s^*}) \cdot P_{s^*+1}$$

Using matrix notation for parameter 'B' this may be expressed as follows :

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s} [B[n,1] \cdot (B[n,2] - B[n-1,2])] - [(Q - B[s^*,2]) \cdot B[s^*+1,1]]$$

Where:

s\* is the highest indexed row of B such that  $Q_{s*} \le Q \le Q_n$  and where,  $Q_0=0$ 

'P' is <u>PD\_EMPh</u><sup>m,t</sup>: <u>pre-dispatch projected energy market price applicable to all</u> <u>delivery points 'm' in the Ontario zone in metering interval 't' of settlement hour</u> <u>'h'the real-time 5-minute energy market price in Ontario during metering interval 't'</u> <u>of settlement hour 'h'</u>;

'Q' is  $DA\_ISD_{k,h}^{i,t}$  as defined below; and

'B' is <u>PDRDA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup></u>: energy offers submitted into the <u>pre-dispatchschedule</u> of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price-quantity pair where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2<u>; or</u>

'B' is PD\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: energy *offers* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price-quantity pair* where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2.

the *offer* matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for the applicable import transaction that was submitted by *market participant* 'k' and scheduled in the *pre-dispatchschedule of record* during *metering interval* 't' for *settlement hour* 'h' of the *real-time trading day* 

and,

Let DA\_ISD<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the day-ahead import scheduling deviation quantity calculated for *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' as determined by the formula:

DA import scheduling deviation quantity $(DA\_ISD_{k,h}^{i,t})$	=	MAX (day-ahead import transaction quantity – real-time-pre-dispatch import transaction quantity, 0)
DA_ISD <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup>	=	MAX (PDRDA_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> – PD_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> , 0) Where: PDRDA_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the <i>pre-dispatchschedule</i> of record constrained-quantity scheduled for injection by market participant 'k' for an import transaction at <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'; and PD_DQSI <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the real-timepre-dispatch constrained-quantity scheduled for injection by <i>market participant</i> 'k' at <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'

Let XPD\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=p^*}^{s^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{s^*}) \times P_{s^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is *energy offers* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2 Let XDA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=c^*}^{d^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{d^*}) \times P_{d^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is energy offers submitted in schedule of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

Such that the day-ahead import failure charge for *market participant* 'k' during *settlement hour* 'h' for all *intertie metering points* 'i' may be formulated with the above components as follows:

 $DA\_IFC_{k,h}$ 

= For all *intertie metering points* and all *metering intervals* during the *settlement hour*:

-1 x <u>MINIMUM of:</u>

#### [MAXIMUM of:

[[The sum of all revenues implied by each import transaction valued at the *real-timepre-dispatch energy market price* in the Ontario zone times-for the difference in quantity scheduled in pre-dispatch and the quanity scheduled in the *schedule of record*day-ahead import scheduling deviation quantity.

Minus:

Those costs represented through the *offers* for the import transaction scheduled in the *pre-dispatchschedule* of record] or zero],

subject to a maximum value of the:

#### MAXIMUM of:

[the pre-dispatch *offer* to increase quantity scheduled in predispatch to quantity scheduled day-ahead minus the dayahead *offer* to increase quantity scheduled in pre-dispatch to quanity scheduled day-aheadin the *schedule of record*] or zero],<del>; or</del>

[day-ahead import scheduling deviation quantity times the MAXIMUM of (zero or the real-timepre-dispatch energy market price in the Ontario zone)]]

$$\overline{DA\_IFC_{k,h}} = \sum_{I,T} (-1) \times MIN \left[ MAX \left[ 0, OP(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA\_ISD_{k,h}^{i,t}, PDR\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t}) \right], \left( MAX(0, EMP_{h}^{m,t}) \times DA\_ISD_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right]$$

 $DA_{IFC_{k,h}} =$ 

$$\sum_{kT} (-1) \times MIN \Big[ MAX \Big( 0, OP \Big( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t} \Big) - OP \Big( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, PD\_DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t} \Big), \\ MAX \Big( 0, XPD\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t} - XDA\_BE_{k,h}^{i,t} \Big), \Big( MAX \big( 0, PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t} \big) \times DA\_ISD_{k,h}^{i,t} \Big) \Big]$$

Where:

**PDRDA**\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> are energy offers submitted into the <u>pre-dispatchschedule</u> of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price-quantity pair where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2;

<u>PD\_BE<sub>k,h</sub></u><sup>i,t</sup> are energy *offers* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price-quantity pair* where offered prices are in column 1 and offered quantities are in column 2;

<u>PD\_EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>m,t</sup>EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>m,t</sup></u> is the *pre-dispatch* projected *energy market price* applicable to all *delivery* points 'm' in the Ontario zone in *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h'real-time 5-minute *energy market price* in Ontario during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h';

'T' is the set of all *metering intervals* 't' in *settlement hour* 'h';

'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'.

#### 3.8D Day Ahead Export Failure Charge

- 3.8D.1 The *IESO* shall apply the day-ahead export failure charge specified in section 3.8D.2 to a *market participant* for any quantity of *energy* scheduled for withdrawal at an *intertie metering point* scheduled in the *schedule of record* where:
  - 3.8D.1.1 the *market participant* fails either in whole or in part to schedule a *dispatch* quantity scheduled for withdrawal in the *pre-dispatch schedule* in the corresponding *metering interval* of the corresponding *settlement hour* at the same *intertie metering point;* and,

- 3.8D.1.2 the *IESO* has not determined, nor has the *market participant* demonstrated to the satisfaction of the *IESO*, that the failure is due to bona fide and legitimate reasons as described in chapter 7, section 7.5.8B; and
- 3.8D.1.3 the export transaction is not part of a day-ahead linked wheel.
- 3.8D.2 For all export transactions scheduled in the *schedule of record* and meeting the criteria of section 3.8D.1, the day-ahead export failure charge shall be formulated as follows:

Let OP(P,Q,B) be a profit function of Price (P), Quantity (Q) and an N by 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s^*} P_n \cdot (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) - (Q - Q_{s^*}) \cdot P_{s^*+1}$$

Using matrix notation for parameter 'B' this may be expressed as follows :

$$OP(P,Q,B) = P \cdot Q - \sum_{n=1}^{s} [B[n,1] \cdot (B[n,2] - B[n-1,2])] - [(Q - B[s^*,2]) \cdot B[s^*+1,1]]$$

Where:

s\* is the highest indexed row of B such that  $Q_{s*} \le Q \le Q_n$  and where,  $Q_0=0$ 

<u>'P' is PD\_EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>m,t</sup>: *pre-dispatch* projected *energy market price* applicable to all *delivery* points 'm' in the Ontario zone in *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h';</u>

<u>'Q' is DA\_ESD<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> as defined below; and</u>

'B' is  $DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t}$ : energy bids submitted into the schedule of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2; or

'B' is PD\_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup>: *energy bids* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *delivery point* 'm' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered *price in each price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2-

the offer matrix of price-quantity pairs for the applicable export transaction that was submitted by market participant 'k' and scheduled in the schedule of record during metering interval 't' for settlement hour 'h' of the real-time trading day

and,

Let XDA\_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\sum_{n=c^*}^{d^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1}) + (Q - Q_{d^*}) \times P_{d^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is energy bids submitted into the schedule of record, represented as an N by 2 matrix of price-quantity pairs for each market participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i' during metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each price quantity pair where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

Let XPD\_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=p^*}^{s^*} P_i \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{s^*}) \times P_{s^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) *energy bids* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

Such that the day-ahead export failure charge for *market participant* 'k' during *settlement hour* 'h' for all *intertie metering points* 'i' may be formulated with the above components as follows:

<u>DA_EFC<sub>k,h</sub></u>	Ξ	For all <i>intertie metering points</i> and all <i>metering intervals</i> during the <u>settlement hour:</u> -1 x MINIMUM of: [MAXIMUM of:
		[-1 x [The sum of all revenues implied by each export transaction valued at the <i>pre-dispatch energy market price</i> in the Ontario zone-times the day ahead export scheduling deviation quantity for the difference in quantity scheduled in pre-dispatch and the quanity scheduled in the <i>schedule of</i> <u>record.</u>
		<u>Minus:</u> <u>Those costs represented through the <i>offers</i> for the export <u>transaction scheduled in the <i>schedule of record</i>]</u> <u>or zero]</u>, <u>subject to a maximum value of the:</u></u>



[the day-ahead *bid* to increase quantity scheduled in predispatch to quantity scheduled day-ahead minus the predispatch *offerbid* to increase quantity scheduled in predispatch to quantity scheduled in the *schedule of record* dayahead]

or zero]<del>; or</del>

MAXIMUM of (zero or the day-ahead *bid* to increase quantity scheduled in pre-dispatch to quantity scheduled day-aheadin the schedule of record)]

 $DA\_EFC_{k,h} =$ 

 $\sum_{I,T} (-1) \times MIN \left[ MAX \left( 0, \underbrace{(-1)}_{k,T} \times OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) - \underbrace{(-1)}_{k,h} \times OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, PD\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right), MAX \left( 0, XDA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} - XPD\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right), MAX \left( 0, XDA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right]$   $\sum_{k,T} (-1) \times MIN \left[ MAX \left( 0, OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) - OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, PD\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) - OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, PD\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right]$ 

$$\int_{T}^{(-1)\times MIN} \left[ MAX \left( 0, OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) - OP \left( PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, PD\_DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t}, DA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right) \\ MAX \left( 0, XDA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} - XPD\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right), MAX \left( 0, XDA\_BL_{k,h}^{i,t} \right) \right]$$

Where:

DA\_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> are energy bids submitted into the *schedule of record*, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered *price in each price quantity pair* where offered prices '*P' are i*n column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2;

<u>PD\_BL<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup> are energy bids submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2</u> matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *intertie metering point* 'i' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered *price in each price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2;

PD\_EMP<sub>h</sub><sup>m,t</sup> is the *pre-dispatch* projected *energy market price* applicable to all *delivery* points 'm' in the Ontario zone in *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h';

'T' is the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h';

'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'.

## 3.8E Day Ahead Linked Wheel Failure Charge

- 3.8E.1 The *IESO* shall apply the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge specified in section 3.8E.2 to a *market participant* for any quantity of *energy* scheduled for a linked wheel at an *intertie metering point* scheduled in the *schedule of record* where:
  - 3.8E.1.1 the *market participant* fails either in whole or in part to schedule a *dispatch* quantity scheduled for a linked wheel in the *pre-dispatch schedule* in the corresponding *metering interval* of the corresponding *settlement hour* at the same *intertie metering point;* and,
  - 3.8E.1.2 the *IESO* has not determined, nor has the *market participant* demonstrated to the satisfaction of the *IESO*, that the failure is due to bona fide and legitimate reasons as described in chapter 7, section 7.5.8B.
- 3.8E.2 For all linked wheel transactions scheduled in the *schedule of record* and meeting the criteria of section 3.8E.1, the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge shall be formulated as follows:

Day-ahead linked wheel	Ξ	MAX[(day-ahead import – hour-ahead pre-
$\frac{\text{scheduling deviation}}{(\text{DA LWSD}_{k,h}^{i,t})}$		<u>dispatch import), (day-ahead export – hour-</u> ahead pre-dispatch export)]
$\underline{DA\_LWSD_{k,h}}^{\underline{i,t}}$	Ξ	$\frac{MAX[(DA DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t} - PD DQSI_{k,h}^{i,t})]}{(DA DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t} - PD DQSW_{k,h}^{i,t})]}$
		Where:
		$\underline{DA}\underline{DQSI}_{k,h}^{i,t}$ is schedule of record quantity
		scheduled for injection by market participant
		'k' at delivery point 'm' during metering
		interval 't' of settlement hour 'h';
		<u>PD_DQSI<sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the <i>pre-dispatch</i> constrained</u>
		quantity scheduled for injection by market
		participant 'k' at intertie metering point 'i'
		during metering interval 't' of settlement hour
		<u>'h';</u>
		<u>DA_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub></u> is the schedule of record
		<u>quantity scheduled for withdrawal by market</u> participant 'k' at delivery point 'm' during
		metering interval 't' of settlement hour 'h';
		and
		<u>PD_DQSW<sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the <i>pre-dispatch</i></u>
		constrained quantity scheduled for withdrawal
		by market participant 'k' at intertie metering
		point 'i' during metering interval 't' of
		<u>settlement hour 'h'</u>

<u>Day-ahead price spread</u> (DA_PS <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> )	Ξ	day-ahead constrained schedule <i>intertie</i> price of the sink for the export transaction minus day-ahead constrained <i>intertie</i> price of the source for the import transaction
<u>DA_PS<sub>k,h</sub><sup>i,t</sup></u>	Ξ	DA_ELMP <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>m,t</sup> – DA_ILMP <sub>k,h</sub> <sup>m,t</sup> Where: DA_ELMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the day-ahead constrained schedule <i>intertie</i> price at the <i>intertie metering</i> <i>point</i> 'i' <i>delivery point</i> 'm' of the sink for the export transaction during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'; and DA_ILMP <sub>h</sub> <sup>i,t</sup> is the day-ahead constrained <i>intertie</i> price at the <i>intertie metering point</i> 'i' <i>delivery point</i> 'm' of the source for the import transaction during <i>metering interval</i> 't' of <i>settlement hour</i> 'h'
<u>Pre-dispatch price spread</u> (PD_PS <sub>k,h</sub> )	Ξ	pre-dispatch constrained schedule <i>intertie</i> price of the sink for the export transaction – pre-dispatch constrained <i>intertie</i> price of the source for the import transaction
PD_PS <sub>k.h</sub> <sup>i.t</sup>	Ξ	PD_ELMP_h^{m,t} - PD_ILMP_h^{m,t}Where:PD_ELMP_h^{i,t} is the pre-dispatch constrainedschedule intertie price at the intertie meteringpoint 'i'delivery point 'm' of the sink for theexport transaction during metering interval 't'of settlement hour 'h'; andPD_ILMP_h^{i,t} is the pre-dispatch constrainedintertie price at the intertie metering point'i'delivery point 'm' of the source for theimport transaction during metering interval 't'of settlement hour 'h'; and
	intertie	lure charge for market participant 'k' metering points 'i' may be formulated with
DA LWFC <sub>k,h</sub> = For all	intertie	metering points and all metering intervals

during the settlement hour: -1 x [The day-ahead linked wheel scheduling deviation quantity.

\_

# Multiplied by: MAXIMUM of: The day-ahead price spread less the pre-dispatch price spread or zero].

 $DA_LWFC_{k,h} =$ 

$$\sum_{\mathbf{I},\mathbf{T}} (-1) \times \left[ \left( \mathsf{DA}_{\mathsf{LWSD}_{k,h}^{i,t}} \right) \times \mathsf{MAX} \left[ 0, \left( \mathsf{DA}_{\mathsf{PS}_{k,h}^{i,t}} - \mathsf{PD}_{\mathsf{PS}_{k,h}^{i,t}} \right) \right] \right]$$

Where:

'T' is the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h';

'I' is the set of all intertie metering points 'i'.

3.8E.3 If a day-ahead linked wheel failure charge specified in section 3.8E.2 applies to a linked wheel where a real-time import failure charge specified in section 3.8C.3 and/or a real-time export for charge specified in section 3.8C.5 applies to the same linked wheel, the lesser of the day-ahead linked wheel failure charge and the sum of the real-time import failure charge and the export failure charge shall apply to the market participant.

# 3.8F Day-Ahead Generator Withdrawal Charge

- 3.8F.1 The *IESO* shall apply the day-ahead *generator* withdrawal charge specified in section 3.8F.2 to a *market participant* who was deemed to have accepted the dayahead production cost guarantee in accordance with Section 5.8.4 of Chapter 7 for any quantity of *energy* scheduled for injection at a *metering point* scheduled in the schedule of record where:
  - 3.8F.1.1 the *market participant* withdraws their commitment scheduled in the schedule of record in the corresponding *metering interval* of the corresponding *settlement hour* at the same *metering point;* and,
  - 3.8F.1.2 the *IESO* has not determined, nor has the *market participant* demonstrated to the satisfaction of the *IESO*, that the failure is due to bona fide and legitimate reasons as described in chapter 7, section 7.5.8B.
- 3.8F.2 The day-ahead *generator* withdrawal charge shall be formulated as follows:

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If withdrawal notification is received at or 4 hours prior to the first withdrawal hour in real time (PD - 4), then the Withdrawal Charge is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{DA\_GWC_{k,\text{hstart}}}{\text{event}} \equiv MIN\left(0, \sum_{i=1}^{n} (-1) \times OP\left(MIN(PD\_EMP_{h}^{m,t}, EMP_{h}^{m,t}), MLP_{k,h}^{m,t}, DA\_BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right)$$

Where:

$$\underline{n} \equiv \frac{\text{the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h' for the total}}{\text{number of hours with a schedule of record that are withdrawn}}$$

start event 
$$=$$
 the set of hours with a contiguous *schedule of record*

If withdrawal notification is received later than PD-4 or if the *market participant* does not notify the IESO of their intent to withdraw and does not inject for the hours committed in the *schedule of record*, then the withdrawal charge is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{DA\_GWC_{k,hstart}}{event} \equiv MIN\left(0, \sum_{i=1}^{n} (-1) \times OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, MLP_{k,h}^{m,t}, DA\_BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right)$$

#### Where:

		the set of all metering intervals 't' in settlement hour 'h' for the total
<u>n</u>	Ξ	number of hours with a <i>schedule of record</i> for the start event that are withdrawn

#### <u>start event</u> $\equiv$ the set of hours with a contiguous *schedule of record*

#### PART 5 – IESO BOARD DECISION RATIONALE

Insert Text Here



# **Market Rule Amendment Proposal**

#### PART 1 – MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identificatio	on No.: MR-00349-R03						
Subject:	Enhance	Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): Settlement Guarantees					
Title:	Settleme	nt Uplifts					
Nature of Pr	roposal:	Alteration		Deletion		Addition	
Chapter:	9			Appendix:			
Sections:	3.9, 4.8						
Sub-sections proposed for amending:			3.9.1, 4.8	8.1.14, 4.8.2.14	(deleted), 4	.8.2.14 (new)	

#### PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY – PLEASE REFER TO MR-00349-R00

Version	Reason for Issuing	Reason for Issuing					
Approved Amendment Publication Date:							
Approved Ame	ndment Effective Date:						

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### **Summary**

This amendment specifies the new and modified settlement amounts (charge types) in sections 3.9 and 4.8 of Chapter 7 resulting from the EDAC design.

#### **Background**

Please refer to MR-00349-R00.

#### **Discussion**

Settlement charges, including many settlement charges introduced to market participants in June 2006 for DACP, will be affected by the implementation of EDAC. While many of those charge types will remain, there will be a need to modify some of them and add new ones.

Specifically in section 3.9.1 there is a need to include the formulae for the following Hourly Settlement Uplifts: the Day-Ahead Export Failure Charge; and, the Day-Ahead Linked Wheel Failure Charge.

Additionally in section 4.8.2 there is a need to include the redistribution of any proceeds from the application of the Generator Withdrawal Charge.

#### Part 4 – Proposed Amendment

#### **3.9 Hourly Uplift Settlement Amounts**

- 3.9.1 The hourly *settlement amounts* defined by the preceding provisions of this section 3 will result in an hourly *settlement* deficit that shall be recovered from *market participants* as a whole through the *hourly uplift*. The total *hourly uplift settlement amount* for *settlement hour* 'h' ("HUSA<sub>h</sub>") shall be determined according to the following equation:
  - $HUSA_{h} = \sum_{K} (NEMSC_{k,h} + ORSC_{k,h} + CAPRSC_{k,h} + CMSC_{k,h} + TRSC_{k,h} + \frac{RT\_IOG_{k,h} + DA\_IOG_{k,h} IOG_{k,h}}{ORSSD_{k,r,h} + DA\_IFC_{k,h} + RT\_IFC_{k,h} + \frac{DA\_EFC_{k,h} + RT\_EFC_{k,h} + \frac{DA\_LWFC_{k,h}}{DA\_LWFC_{k,h}}$

over all 'k' market participants

.....

 $RT\_IOG_{k,h}$  = real-time intertie offer guarantee settlement credit for the *market participant* associated with that *boundary entity* 'k' in *settlement hour* 'h'

 $DA\_IOG_{k,h}$  = day ahead intertie offer guarantee settlement credit for the *market participant* 'k' in *settlement hour* 'h'

 $\underline{IOG_{k,h}}$  = intertie offer guarantee settlement credit for the *market* participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

 $DA_{IFC_{k,h}} = day-ahead import failure charge for the$ *market*participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

 $RT_{i,h}$  = real-time import failure charge for the *market* participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

<u>DA\_EFC<sub>k,h</sub>= day-ahead export failure charge for the *market* participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'</u>

 $RT\_EFC_{k,h}$ = real-time export failure charge for the *market* participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

<u>DA\_LWFC<sub>k,h</sub>= day-ahead linked wheel failure charge for the *market* participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'</u>

 $TCRF_h$  = transmission charge reduction fund contribution in *settlement hour* 'h'

 $CRSSD_{k,h} = capacity reserve settlement$  debit for operating deviations for market participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

 $ORSSD_{k,r,h} = operating reserve settlement$  debit for operating deviations for class r reserve for market participant 'k' in settlement hour 'h'

Where:

'K' is the set of all market participants 'k'

'R' is the set of each class r of *operating reserve* 

#### 4.8 Additional Non-Hourly Settlement Amounts

4.8.1 The *IESO* shall, at the end of each *energy market billing period*, recover from *market participants*, on a pro-rata basis across all allocated quantities of *energy* withdrawn at

all *RWMs* and *intertie metering points* during all *metering intervals* and *settlement hours* within that *energy market billing period*, the following amounts:

- 4.8.1.1 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 5.3.4 of Chapter 4;
- 4.8.1.2 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 5.3.4 of Chapter 5;
- 4.8.1.3 any out-of-pocket expenses paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 6.7.4 of Chapter 5;
- 4.8.1.4 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 8.4A.9 of Chapter 7;
- 4.8.1.5 any costs incurred in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* to acquire *emergency energy* pursuant to section 2.3.3A of Chapter 5; and

4.8.1.6 any reimbursement paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 2.1A.12.2(a);

- 4.8.1.7 any funds borrowed by the *IESO* and any associated interest costs incurred by the *IESO* in the preceding *energy market billing period* pursuant to section 6.14.5.2;
- 4.8.1.8 [Intentionally left blank section deleted]
- 4.8.1.9 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 4.7B.3;
- 4.8.1.10 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 4.7C;
- 4.8.1.11 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* pursuant to section 8.2.6 of Chapter 5;
- 4.8.1.12 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* under section 4.7D;
- 4.8.1.13 any compensation paid in that *energy market billing period* by the *IESO* under section 4.7E; <u>and</u>
- 4.8.1.14 any day-ahead *intertic offer* guarantee costs that are not recovered as a component of *hourly uplift* under section 3.9.4; and[Intentionally left blank section deleted]

4.8.1.15 any compensation for Emergency Load Reduction Program participants paid in that *energy market billing* period by the *IESO* pursuant to section 4.7F.

- 4.8.2 The *IESO* shall, at the end of each *energy market billing period*, distribute to *market participants*, on a pro-rata basis across all allocated quantities of *energy* withdrawn at all *RWMs* and *intertie metering points* during all *metering intervals* and *settlement hours* within that *energy market billing period*, the following amounts:
  - 4.8.2.1 any compensation received by the *IESO* for the provision of *emergency energy* pursuant to section 4.4A.1 of Chapter 5;
  - 4.8.2.2 any compensation received by the *IESO* as a result of a local market power investigation as set out in sections 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 of Appendix 7.6;
  - 4.8.2.3 any adjustments to *intertic offer* guarantee *settlement* credits for wheeling through transactions, in accordance with section 3.5.8.1 of Chapter 7, calculated pursuant to section 3.8A.3;[Intentionally left blank section <u>deleted]</u>
  - 4.8.2.4 [Intentionally left blank section deleted]
  - 4.8.2.5 any payments recovered by the *IESO* in accordance with section 3.5.1A of chapter 9;
  - 4.8.2.6 any adjustments made by the *IESO* in accordance with section 3.5.7 of Chapter 9;
  - 4.8.2.7 any adjustments to Transitional Demand Response Program payments pursuant to section 4.7C;
  - 4.8.2.8 any proceeds from the day-ahead import failure charge that are not distributed as a component of *hourly uplift* under section 3.9.4;
  - 4.8.2.9 any proceeds from the real-time import failure charge or the real- time export failure charge that in accordance with section 3.9.5 are not distributed as a component of *hourly uplift*;
  - 4.8.2.10 any proceeds from the recovery of congestion management *settlement* credits or other *settlement amounts* in accordance with section 6.6.10A.2 of Chapter 3, excluding any payments recovered under section 4.18.1.6 of Chapter 8;
  - 4.8.2.11 any recovery of day-ahead *intertie offer* guarantee payments pursuant to section 3.3A.13 of Chapter 7;
  - 4.8.2.12 any adjustments to Emergency Load Reduction Program payments pursuant to section 4.7F; and
  - 4.8.2.13 any recovery of payments made by the *IESO* under section 3.5.9; and

# <u>4.8.2.14</u> any proceeds from the day-ahead generator withdrawal charge under section 3.8F.

#### PART 5 – IESO BOARD DECISION RATIONALE

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# Market Rule Amendment Proposal

#### PART 1 - MARKET RULE INFORMATION

Identificatio	n No.: MR-00349-R04						
Subject:	Enhanced	Enhanced Day-Ahead Commitment Process (EDAC): Settlement Guarantees					
Title:							
Nature of Pr	coposal:	Alteration		Deletion		Addition	
Chapter:	9						
Sections:	4.7D, 4.7E						
Sub-sections proposed for amending: various							

#### PART 2 – PROPOSAL HISTORY – PLEASE REFER TO MR-00349-R00

Version	<b>Reason for Issuing</b>	Reason for Issuing					
Approved Amendment Publication Date:							
Approved Amer	ndment Effective Date:						

Provide a brief description of the following:

- The reason for the proposed amendment and the impact on the *IESO-administered markets* if the amendment is not made.
- Alternative solutions considered.
- The proposed amendment, how the amendment addresses the above reason and impact of the proposed amendment on the *IESO-administered markets*.

#### Summary

MR-00349-R04 proposes to specify the settlement of the Day-Ahead Production Cost Guarantee Settlement Amounts.

Background

Please refer to MR-00349-R00.

Discussion

Please refer to MR-00349-R00, Part 3.

#### PART 4 – PROPOSED AMENDMENT

#### 4.7D Day-Ahead Generation Production Cost Guarantee Payments

4.7D.1 The *IESO* shall determine on a *per-start* basis, for each *generation facility* that has met the criteria set out in chapter 7, sections 2.2C and 6.3B5.8.4, a day-ahead generation production costs guarantee consisting of the following-on the basis of the following components:

4.7D.1.1

a. Component 1 is any shortfall in payment on the delivered real-time dispatch of the schedule of record and will be based upon the realtime revenue received for that amount of energy in comparison with the value as represented in the generator's day-ahead offer for incremental energy and speed-no-load costs;

- b. Component 2 is the value of arranging the delivery (where the realtime offer is less than the day-ahead offer), or any gain (where the real-time offer is greater than the day-ahead offer)<sup>3</sup> for the portion of schedule of record quantity that is not implemented in the realtime dispatch schedule;
- c. Component 3 is any income from real-time *energy* congestion management settlement credit (CMSC) included in a *generator's schedule of record* delivered in real-time and will be used to reduce the day-ahead production cost guarantee payment;
- d. Component 4 is any income from real-time *operating reserve* in a *generator's schedule of record* that was not dispatched in real-time and will be used to reduce the day-ahead production cost guarantee payment; and
- e. Component 5 is the as-offered *start-up cost* (as-offered value of bringing an off-line *generator* on-line to *minimum loading point*).
- 4.7D.2 The *IESO* shall determine the type of schedule and which components described in Section 4.7D.1 are included in the day-ahead production cost guarantee, for each *generation facility*, as follows:

# 4.7D.2.1

- a. Variant 1: If the *generation unit* is not operating from the previous *dispatch day* into the current *dispatch day*, the day-ahead production costs guarantee calculation for the current *dispatch day* includes Components 1 through 5. Variant 1 occurs when:
  - the generation unit is not operating at the end of the previous EDAC dispatch day (Day-1 HE 24 indicates off-line status); or
  - the generation unit is operating at the end of the previous EDAC dispatch day (Day-1, HE 24 indicates on-line status) but it is not operating into the current EDAC dispatch day (Day 0, HE 1 indicates off-line status); or
  - the generation unit is scheduled to start later in the current EDAC dispatch day.;
- b. Variant 2: If the *generation unit* is operating from the previous <u>dispatch day into the current dispatch day, to complete its</u> <u>minimum generation block run-time the day-ahead production</u> <u>costs guarantee calculation for the current dispatch day includes</u> <u>Components 1 through 4 but does not include Component 5. The</u>

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{3}{2}$  Where the real-time *offer* is equal to the day-ahead *offer*, the value/gain is equal to zero (0).

day-ahead production costs guarantee calculation also includes a clawback for Component 1 and Component 3

- <u>c.</u> Variant 3: If a generation unit is operating from the previous dispatch day into the current dispatch day and has completed its minimum generation block run-time in the previous dispatch day, the day-ahead production costs guarantee calculation for the current dispatch day includes Components 1 through 4 but does not include Component 5. Variant 3 occurs when:
  - the generation unit is operating from the previous EDAC dispatch day (Day-1, HE 24 indicates on-line status) into the current EDAC dispatch day (Day 0, HE 1 indicates on-line status) and has completed its MGBRT in the previous EDAC dispatch day; or
  - the generation unit is operating from the previous EDAC dispatch day (Day-1, HE 24 indicates on-line status) into the current EDAC dispatch day, (Day 0, HE 1 indicates on-line status) and has not completed its MGBRT and is scheduled in the current EDAC dispatch day for hours in excess of completing its MGBRT from the previous EDAC dispatch day. Variant 3 in the current EDAC dispatch day is only for the hours in excess of completing the MGBRT hours for the start from the previous EDAC dispatch day.
- 4.7D.1.1 the sum of the following revenues earned in each *dispatch interval* during the period from synchronisation to the end of the *minimum run*-*time*:
  - a. *energy market prices* multiplied by the sum of the applicable AQEI and any applicable *physical allocation data*, for *energy* injected up to and including the *minimum loading point*;
  - b. hourly settlement amounts for operating reserve; and
  - c. any congestion management *settlement* credit payments resulting from the *facility* being constrained on in order to meet its *minimum loading point*; and
- 4.7D.1.2 the applicable day-ahead *combined guaranteed costs* and other costs specified in this section submitted by the *market participant* for the specified *generation facility* for the start to which the revenues determined in accordance with 4.7D.1.1 apply. The other costs that are to be considered in addition to those specified in the definition of *combined guaranteed cost*, day-ahead *combined guaranteed* costs are:
  - a. incremental variable operating costs; and
  - b. incremental variable maintenance costs;
  - where both of these additional cost components have, in the opinion of the *IESO*, a reasonable and demonstrable link with the day-ahead

commitment to which they pertain and are reported to the *IESO* in the manner specified in the applicable *market manual*.

- 4.7D.3 The IESO shall calculate the day-ahead production cost guarantee components 1 through 4 for each interval in the *schedule of record* where the *generator* is injecting into the *IESO-controlled grid*.
- <u>4.7D.4 The IESO shall calculate the day-ahead production cost guarantee components based</u> on the type of schedule described in Section 4.7D.2.1 as follows:

# Component 1 – Variants 1, 2 and 3

Component 1 includes any shortfall in payment for the minimum of the *generator's schedule of record*, real-time constrained schedule and the allocated quantity of *energy* injected based upon the real-time revenue received for that amount of *energy* in comparison with the costs as represented in the *generator's* day-ahead *offer*. Component 1 is calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{PCG COMP1}_{kh}^{mt}}{\text{PCG COMP1}_{kh}^{mt}} = \frac{\text{All day-ahead costs excluding as-offered start-up costs for the minimum}}{\frac{\text{of the generator's schedule of record, real-time constrained scheduled}}{\text{and the allocated quantity of energy injected over the interval minus all}}}$$

$$\underline{PCG \ COMP1_{kh}^{m,t}} \equiv (-1) \times OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, MIN\left(DA_{DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}}, DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}\right), DA_{BE_{k,h}^{m,t}}\right) + \frac{DA_{SNLC_{k,h}^{m}}}{12}$$

# <u> Component 1 Clawback – Variant 2</u>

<u>Component 1 Clawback recovers the day-ahead production cost guarantee Component 1 paid up to</u> the *minimum loading point* for the remaining hours of *MGBRT*. Component 1 Clawback– Variant 2 is calculated as follows:

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP1\_CB_{kh}mt} = \frac{All day-ahead costs excluding as-offered start-up costs up to the}{allocated quantity of energy injected over the interval minus all real-time}$ 

$$\underline{PCG\_COMP1\_CB_{kh}^{m,t}} \equiv (-1) \times OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, MIN\left(AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, MLP_{k,h}^{m,t}\right), DA\_BE^{im,t}\right) + \frac{DA\_SNLC_{k,h}^{m}}{12}$$

### Component 2 – Variants 1, 2 and 3

If, as a result of economic selection, a portion of the *schedule of record* is not implemented in the real-time *dispatch* schedule, the day-ahead production cost guarantee:

- Guarantees the cost of arranging the delivery if the real-time *offer price* is less than the day-ahead *offer price*; or
- Subtracts any gain where the real-time *offer price* is greater than the day-ahead *offer price*.

In the absence of a forced de-rating or a scheduled de-rating, if there are no real-time *energy offers* for any portion of the day-ahead constrained schedule, the real-time *energy offers* for that portion of *energy* will be set to MMCP (*Maximum Market Clearing Price*) for the purposes of calculating Component 2.

If the real-time *energy offers* for any portion of the day-ahead constrained schedule is below \$0.00 \$/MWh (i.e. negative), the real-time *energy offers* for that portion of *energy* will be set to \$0.00 \$/MWh for the purposes of calculating Component 2.

Component 2 is calculated as follows:

<u>As-offered day-ahead costs excluding as-offered *start-up costs* for the difference between:</u>

• the minimum of the *generator's schedule of record*, the de-rated value of the *generation facility* or the maximum of the real-time constrained schedule and the allocated quantity of *energy* injected; and

<u>PCG\_COMP2<sub>k,h</sub>m.t</u>  $\equiv$ 

• the minimum of the generator's schedule of record and the derated value of the generation facility

over the interval minus all real-time *energy offers* (with a minimum limit of zero) over the interval for that amount of *energy* 

<u>PCG\_COMP2<sub>k,h</sub>m,t</u> =

 $XDA_BE_{k,h}^{m,t}-MAX(0,XBE_{k,h}^{m,t})$ 

#### Where:

<u>Let  $XBE_{k,h}^{m,t}$  be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n x</u> matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:

$$\left[\sum_{n=p^*}^{s^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{s^*}) \times P_{s^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is *energy offers* submitted in real-time, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at metering point 'm' during metering *interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

<u>Let XDA\_BE<sub>k,h</sub><sup>m,t</sup> be the function which calculates the area under the curve created by an n</u> <u>x 2 matrix (B) of offered *price-quantity pairs*:</u>

$$\left[\sum_{n=c^*}^{d^*} P_n \times (Q_n - Q_{n-1})\right] + (Q - Q_{d^*}) \times P_{d^{*+1}}$$

where matrix (B) is *energy offers* submitted in pre-dispatch, represented as an N by 2 matrix of *price-quantity pairs* for each *market participant* 'k' at *metering point* 'm' during *metering interval* 't' of *settlement hour* 'h' arranged in ascending order by the offered price in each *price quantity pair* where offered prices 'P' are in column 1 and offered quantities 'Q' are in column 2

$$\mathbf{c}^{*} \qquad \equiv \frac{\text{the highest indexed row of matrix XDA BE_{k,h}^{m,t} such that Q_{c^{*}} \leq \\ \frac{\min[DA DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, OPCAP_{k,h}^{m,t}, \max(DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, Max_{k,h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, Max_{k,h}^{m,t}, Max_{k,h}^{m,$$

# Component 3 – Variants 1, 2 and 3

• The day-ahead production cost guarantee payment for a *generator* will be reduced by the income received from real time congestion management settlement credits (CMSC) for the *generator's schedule of record* delivered in real-time.

- The *generator's schedule of record* will be measured against both the real-time constrained schedule and the real-time unconstrained schedule to determine the amount of revenue from congestion management settlement credits that should be included in the day-ahead production cost guarantee calculation.
- For any interval, there are six possible orderings of the amount of a *generation* facility's capacity that may be included in the schedule of record, the real-time constrained schedule and the real-time unconstrained schedule. The table below summarizes the six possible orderings and the inclusion of Component 3 in the dayahead production cost guarantee calculation.

For the purposes of determining the applicable CMSC in Component 3, the offer price is subject to Section 3.5.6.

# Table: Ordering of Generator's Capacity and Day-Ahead Production Cost Guarantee Component 3

<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Ordering</u>	Component 3 - CMSC Included?
<u>1</u>	$\underline{DQSI} \ge MQSI \ge DA \underline{DQSI}$	N
<u>2</u>	$MQSI \ge DQSI \ge DA DQSI$	<u>N</u>
<u>3</u>	$\underline{DQSI} > \underline{DA}\underline{DQSI} > \underline{MQSI}$	Y (Partial CMSC)
4	MQSI > DA_DQSI > DQSI	Y (Partial CMSC)
<u>5</u>	$DA_DQSI >= DQSI > MQSI$	Y (All CMSC)
<u>6</u>	$\underline{DA}\underline{DQSI} \ge \underline{MQSI} \ge \underline{DQSI}$	Y (All CMSC)

Component 3 is calculated as follows :

=

PCG\_COMP3<sub>k.h</sub>m.t

Income received from real time congestion management settlement credits (CMSC) for the *generator's* schedule of record delivered in realtime over the interval

Component 3 is only calculated when:

- the real-time CMSC  $(TD_{k,h,105}^{m,t})$  for the same interval is a value other than zero; and
- the mathematical sign of (DQSI-MQSI) is equal to the mathematical sign of (AQEI-MQSI).

Scenario 1

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP3_{k,h}}\underline{m,t} \quad \underline{=} \quad \underline{0}$ 

#### Scenario 2

<u>PCG\_COMP3<sub>k,h</sub>m,t</u> = <u>0</u>

#### Scenario 3

$$\frac{\text{PCG} \text{ COMP3}_{kh}^{m,t}}{=} = - \text{MAX} \left( \text{OP}(\text{EMP}_{h}^{m,t}, \text{DA}_{\text{DQSI}_{k,h}^{m,t}}, \text{BE}_{k,h}^{m,t}), \text{OP}(\text{EMP}_{h}^{m,t}, \text{AQEI}_{k,h}^{m,t}, \text{BE}_{k,h}^{m,t}) \right)$$

#### <u>Scenario 4</u>

$$\underline{PCG \ COMP3_{kh}}^{m.t} \equiv -MAX \left( OP(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DA_{-}DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}) - MAX \left( OP(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}), OP(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}) \right)$$

#### <u>Scenario 5</u>

$$\underline{PCG \ COMP3_{kh}} \equiv \frac{Congestion \ management \ settlement \ credit \ calculated \ as \ per \ Section}{3.5.}$$

#### Scenario 6

PCG_COMP3 <sub>k,h</sub> m.t	Ξ	Congestion management settlement credit calculated as per Section 3.5.
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#### Component 3 Clawback – Variant 2

 Component 3 Clawback – Variant 2 recovers the congestion management settlement credits (CMSC) paid up to the *minimum loading point* for the remaining hours of MGBRT. Component 3 Clawback – Variant 2 is calculated as follows :

$$\underline{PCG\_COMP3\_CB_{k,h}}^{m,t} = \frac{Income received from real time congestion management settlement}{credits (CMSC) from the minimum of generation facility's minimum} \\ \underline{loading point and the allocated quantity of energy injected to the}{generator's real-time unconstrained schedule over the interval}$$

Component 3 Clawback - Variant 2 is only calculated when:

- the day-ahead schedule is not less than both the real-time constrained schedule and the realtime unconstrained schedule and the event is a constrained-on event (i.e. Scenarios 3 and 5);
- the minimum loading point is greater than the real-time unconstrained schedule; and
- Component 3 (PCG\_COMP3<sub>k,h</sub><sup>m,t</sup>) for the same interval is a value other than zero.

Scenario 1

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP3\_CB_{k,h}}^{\underline{m,t}} = \underline{0}$ 

#### Scenario 2

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP3\_CB_{k,h}} \equiv \underline{0}$ 

#### Scenario 3

In Scenario 3, the clawback (PCG\_COMP3\_CB<sub>k,h</sub><sup>m,t</sup>) is only calculated when the *minimum loading point* is greater than the real-time unconstrained schedule.

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP3\_CB_{k,h}}^{m,t} \equiv \frac{MAX\left(OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t},MLP_{k,h}^{m,t},BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right),OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t},AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t},BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right)}{-OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t},MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t},BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)}$ 

#### Scenario 4

<u>PCG COMP3 CB<sub>k,h</sub> $m_{t} \equiv 0$ </u>

#### Scenario 5

In Scenario 5, the clawback (PCG\_COMP3\_CB<sub>k,h</sub><sup>m,t</sup>) is only calculated when the *minimum loading point* is greater than the real-time unconstrained schedule.

$$\underline{PCG \ COMP3 \ CB_{k,h}^{m,t}} \equiv \frac{MAX\left(OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, MLP_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right), OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, AQEI_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right)}{-OP\left(EMP_{h}^{m,t}, MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, BE_{k,h}^{m,t}\right)}$$

<u>Scenario 6</u>

<u>PCG\_COMP3\_CB<sub>k,h</sub>mt</u> = 0

# Component 4 – Variants 1, 2 and 3

The day-ahead production cost guarantee payment for a *generator* will be reduced by the income received from real-time *operating reserve* for the *generator's schedule of record* not dispatched in real-time.

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Component 4 is calculated as follows:

PCG_COMP4 <sub>k.h</sub> <sup>m.t</sup>	Ξ	net income received from real-time <i>operating reserve</i> over the interval for the <i>generator's schedule of record</i> not dispatched in real-time
<u>PCG_COMP4<sub>k.h</sub>mt</u>	Ξ	$OP(PROR_{r1,h}^{m,t}, 30R_SQROR_{r1,k,h}^{m,t}, BR_{k,h}^{m,t}) + OP(PROR_{r2,h}^{m,t}, 10NS_SQROR_{r2,k,h}^{m,t}, BR_{k,h}^{m,t}) + OP(PROR_{r3,h}^{m,t}, 10S_SQROR_{r3,k,h}^{m,t}, BR_{k,h}^{m,t})$
Where:		
<u>r1</u>	Ξ	30-minute operating reserve
<u>r2</u>	Ξ	10-minute non-spinning operating reserve
<u>r3</u>	Ξ	10-minute spinning operating reserve
<u>30R_SQROR<sub>r1.k.h</sub>m.t</u>	Ξ	$MAX \left[0, MIN \left(DA_DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}-MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}, SQROR_{r1,k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right]$
<u>10NS SQROR<sub>r2.kh</sub>m.t</u>	Ξ	$MAX \left[0, MIN \left(DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}-MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t}-30R\_SQROR_{r1,k,h}^{m,t}, SQROR_{r2,k,h}^{m,t}\right)\right]$
<u>10S SQROR<sub>r3.k.h</sub>m.t</u>	Ξ	$\begin{split} MAX \left[ 0, MIN \left( DA\_DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t} - MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t} - 30R\_SQROR_{r1,k,h}^{m,t} \right. \\ \left10NS\_SQROR_{r2,k,h}^{m,t}, SQROR_{r3,k,h}^{m,t} \right) \right] \end{split}$
<u>x*</u>	Ξ	the highest indexed row of matrix $BR_{r1,kh}^{mt}$ , such that $QR_{x^*} \le \max[0,\min(DA \ DQSI_{kh}^{m,t} - MQSI_{kh}^{m,t}, SQROR_{r1,kh}^{m,t})] \le QR_n$ and where $QR_0 = 0$
<u>y*</u>	Ξ	the highest indexed row of matrix $BR_{r2,k,h}^{m,t}$ such that $QR_{v^*} \leq max[0,min(DA_DQSI_{k,h}^{m,t} - MQSI_{k,h}^{m,t} - 30R_SQROR_{r1,k,h}^{m,t}, SQROR_{r2,k,h}^{m,t})] \leq QR_n$ and where $QR_0 = 0$
<u>z*</u>	Ξ	the highest indexed row of matrix $BR_{r3,kh}^{mt}$ , such that $QR_{z^*} \le max[0,min(DA DQSI_{kh}^{m,t} - MQSI_{kh}^{m,t} - 30R SQROR_{r1,kh}^{m,t} - 10NS_SQROR_{r1,kh}^{m,t}$ , $SQROR_{r3,kh}^{m,t}$ , $] \le QR_n$ and where $QR_0 = 0$

# <u>Component 5 – Variant 1</u>

<u>Component 5 is the as-offered *start-up cost* incurred to bring an off-line *generation facility* through all the unit specific start-up procedures, including synchronization and ramp up to *minimum loading point*. Component 5 is calculated as follows:</u>

 $\underline{PCG\_COMP5_{kh}}^{m.t} \equiv \frac{\text{As-offered start-up cost submitted by the market participant for the}}{\underline{EDAC start event.}}$ 

The rules for calculating Component 5 are as follows:

- Scenario 1: If the *market participant* achieves *minimum loading point* within the first 6 intervals<sup>4</sup> of the start of the EDAC scheduled period, the full as-offered *start-up cost* is considered.
- Scenario 2: If the *market participant* achieves *minimum loading point* between the start of the 7<sup>th</sup> interval and before the start of the 18<sup>th</sup> interval of the start of the EDAC scheduled period, the as-offered *start-up cost* is calculated on a fractional basis. The as-offered *start-up cost* is calculated based on the number of 5-minute intervals the resource takes to achieve *minimum loading point* between the start of the 7<sup>th</sup> interval and before the start of the 18<sup>th</sup> interval.
- Scenario 3: If the *market participant* achieves *minimum loading point* after the 17<sup>th</sup> interval of the start of the EDAC scheduled period (i.e. 18<sup>th</sup> interval and onwards), the as-offered *start-up cost* is not considered.

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<u>Scenario 1</u>
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```
PCG_COMP5_{k,h}^{m,t}=DA_SUC_{k,h}^{m}Scenario 2PCG_{COMP5_{k,h}^{m,t}}=DA_SUC_{k,h}^{m} - \left(DA_SUC_{k,h}^{m} \times \frac{1}{DA_{INT}} \times SUC_{INT}\right)WhereDA_INT=12SUC_INT=number of 5-minute intervals between Interval 7 and 18 the market participant takes to achieve minimum loading point.
```

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The duration of an interval is 5 minutes.

<u>Scenario 3</u>

<u>PCG\_COMP5<sub>k,h</sub>m,t</u>  $\equiv$  <u>0</u>

## Component 5 – Variants 2 and 3

Component 5 is not calculated for Variants 2 and 3.

- 4.7D.5 If for each EDAC start event for each eligible generation facility the sum of the revenues referred to in section 4.7D.3 calculated pursuant to section 4.7D.1.1 is greater than or equal to the sum of the costs referred to in section 4.7D.34.7D.1.2, then the IESO shall make no additional payments in respect of the eligible generation facility.
- 4.7D.<u>6</u> If for each <u>EDAC start event for each eligible generation facility</u> the sum of the revenues <u>referred to in section 4.7D.3</u> calculated pursuant to section 4.7D.1.1 is less than the sum of the costs referred to in section <u>4.7D.3</u>4.7D.1.2, then the *IESO* shall calculate that difference and shall include that amount in the form of additional payments made in respect of the eligible generation facility.

#### 4.7E Day-Ahead Fuel Cost Compensation Settlement Amount

- 4.7E.1 In the event that the *IESO*, in order to maintain reliable operation of the *IESO*controlled grid requires a generation facility:
  - that was included in the constrained schedule from the *pre-dispatchschedule* of *record*; and
  - for which the *registered market participant* for the *generation facility* <u>who is deemed</u> <u>to have accepted the day-ahead generation production cost guarantee in accordance</u> <u>with Section 5.8.4 of Chapter 7</u>;

to either to desynchronize from the *IESO-controlled grid* prior to the end of its *minimum run-time*commitment scheduled in the *schedule of record* or not to not synchronize to the *IESO-controlled grid*, the *market participant* may, in accordance with chapter 7 section 6.3B, claim, in the manner specified in the applicable *market manual*, reimbursement of financial losses related to the procurement of fuel for operation at its *minimum loading point* for its minimum run-timecommitment scheduled in the *schedule of record* and which was not ultimately utilized by that *generation facility*.

4.7E.2 Where the *IESO* determines that claims made under section 4.7E.1 are valid, such compensation claims will be applied to the *market participant's settlement statement* for the last *trading day* of each *real-time market billing period* after the determination has been made.

- 4.7E.3 All claims made to the *IESO* pursuant to section 4.7E.1 may be subject to audit by the *IESO* which may obligate the *market participant* to demonstrate or otherwise make a binding declaration that the financial loss being claimed was not mitigated through the actions of:
  - the market participant;
  - an *affiliate* or subsidiary of the *market participant*; or
  - any other party that may have a commercial relationship with the *market participant* where that commercial relationship involves compensation of any kind that is directly related to the mitigation of the financial loss being claimed.
- 4.7E.4 The cumulative *settlement amounts* payable to *market participants* for each real-time *energy market billing period* under the provisions of section 4.7E.2 shall be recovered from *market participants* in accordance with section 4.8.1.12.